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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

America in the 1960s ran the gamut of social, economic, and political changes,
from the assassination of political leaders to the apocalyptic potential of the Cuban
Missile Crisis; from President Lyndon B. Johnson's promises of a Great Society, to the
paralyzing effects of the Vietnam War. At the center of these domestic and international
battles lay the "baby boomers," the largest-ever generation of Americans, and, not
coincidentally, the largest generation of college students to enter the "ivory towers" of
higher education. Raised in an era defined by cries for civil rights and "participatory
democracy," these youths entered higher education determined to change the world. The
difference between this generation and their predecessors, however, was that this group's
unprecedented size offered the potential to affect real change. Using the university as
their battleground, these idealistic young men and women declared war on the patriarchal
political and social structures imposed by collegiate administrations.
The Vietnam War undoubtedly played a major role in the explosion of student
activism in the late sixties, but this only partly explains why students rioted in the streets
of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, or why one-fourth of Eastern Illinois
University's enrollment marched on their president's home. Instead, there existed this
sense that American society in particular and the West in general were at a social and
political crossroads; a feeling especially among students that they lived in a time of
profound possibilities and promise; a consensus that demanded student action against an
outdated "system" that included not only national policies, but especially collegiate issues
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that directly affected them. Students, perhaps unconsciously, sensed America slipping
into a state of decline, or a "twilight age" as then University of California-Riverside
sociologist Robert Nisbet called it, which was characterized by a loss of social authority
and hierarchy, and a decline in attachment to political values, coupled, perhaps not
paradoxically, with the spread of oppressive state machinery. 1
The movement initially commenced in part to prevent this downward slide. As
evident in this case study of three Illinois universities, however, these student activists
discovered that large-scale nationwide protests fell on deaf ears of the U.S. government.
Yet this did little to dispel the rebelliousness pervading the college community. Students
in the late sixties instead shifted their energy and focused on righting local campus
wrongs such as dictatorially imposed rules and regulations, while concerns such as the
Vietnam War sometimes fell to the background. 2 As one study of Southern Illinois
University at Carbondale concluded, "local issues-the ones that clearly touched on their
lives, their campus, and their right to express themselves and have a good timegalvanized many students to join the movements of the 1960s ... at this level (in the
Midwest and the South), the movement mixed national and local issues." 3
These battles between students and the university arose over the university's
transition to a new type of institution. Consistent with the tenor of the times, the larger
1 For

more on this see Robert A. Nisbet, Twilight ofAuthority (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1975).
2 Throughout this work, "local" or "neighborhood" issues will often include issues of race,
women's liberation, the drug culture, and student rights. I recognize that these topics were both national
and global, but I use the word "local" because these students articulated and approached them in a very
grass-roots manner. Students often addressed these issues only when they actually appeared on their own
campus.
3

David Cochran and Robbie Lieberman, "We Closed Down the Damn School: The Party Culture
and Student Protest at Southern Illinois University during the Vietnam War Era," Peace and Change 26
(July 2001): 317.

3
societal issues gripping the nation forced colleges and universities to abandon their
traditional isolationism from society, their "ivory tower."

The gradual intrusion of

exterior pressing issues divided the college community and created an institution not of
one, or "uni," but of many, or "multi." Coined by the founder of the University of
California system, Clark Kerr, this appropriately titled "multiversity" consisted of
multiple conflicting "nations" or cultures, the most important of whom were students,
faculty, and administrators.

These factions presided over their own territories,

governments, and jurisdictions, and often declared war on one another.

Kerr's ideal

"multiversity" held as its goal coexistence rather than peace, and its leadership, the
university president, acted as a "mediator," maintaining peace and ensuring progress. 4
But many traditional university members did not embrace this new "multiversity,"
and university presidents especially despised their relegation from leader to coordinator.
Meanwhile, students and faculty demanded greater "democracy" or shared governance.
By the time antiwar activism occupied center stage on campuses, this old, patriarchal
system clashed violently with Kerr's new "multiversity" and turned higher education on
its head, setting the stage for the greatest war of the sixties: the Battle for the University.
Yet, these issues have received little in-depth historical analysis and the
historiography of higher education during the anti-Vietnam era is underdeveloped and
frequently biased. Actual antiwar participants, or at least those that lived through the
period, disproportionately have written on this topic.

Among the more reputable

literature is Todd Gitlin's The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage, Tom Hayden's

Reunion: A Memoir, and numerous publications by conservative "turncoat" David
Horowitz. Insightful as such works may be, they remain too polemical, rarely offering
4

Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963): 36-37.
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balanced insights and analysis. Personal histories are often centered on the Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS) (unsurprising considering the extensive involvement of men
like Gitlin and Hayden in the organization), and rarely do they discuss faculty and
administration reactions, issues usually dismissed as unimportant or oppositional.
Historian Andrew Hunt has noted this orientation, lamenting a biased historiography and
contending that, "SDS provides an inadequate conceptual framework for understanding
the breadth of protest activity in the 1960s and 1970s."5
A number of scholars have examined individual college campuses during this
turbulent era, including case studies of institutions like Michigan State University and
State University of New York at Buffalo. Kenneth Heineman's work, Campus Wars: the
Peace Movement at American State Universities in the Vietnam Era serves as something

of a model for this thesis, as he also compared antiwar activity at several non-elite
universities. Incorporating a plethora of primary sources including personal interviews,
underground newspapers, and archival material, Heineman exhaustively explored each of
the three factions--administration, students, and faculty--to examine the motivation
behind "the movement," as well as its opposition.
Although this study tests Heineman's conclusions that Vietnam-era student
activism often manifested itself at the local level, it is not merely a repeat of Heineman's
pioneering contribution. While Heineman correctly revises sixties' historiography by
showing how non-elite schools like Kent State and Pennsylvania State University were
just as instrumental in forging campus activism as Berkeley and Columbia, the schools he
chose to study paralleled each other in size and nature, as most were large, public state

5

Andrew Hunt, "When Did the Sixties Happen? Searching for New Directions," Journal of
Social History 33(1) (fall 1999): 147.

5
universities. 6 As such it creates an inherent flaw when attempting to generalize his
findings since most American universities were smaller.
This thesis differs because the selected schools vary considerably with regards to
student population and school structure. The three schools examined here represent a
remarkably diverse sample of campus atmospheres not only in Illinois, but also
nationally. Eastern Illinois University (EIU) represents the stereotypical conservative,
isolated and parochial public institution. The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
(UIUC) represents EIU' s opposite, and therefore must be included on the extreme radical
end of the spectrum. Finally, as a small, private university remotely located over 150
miles from a major city, Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU) differs tremendously from
the other two institutions. IWU' s 1960s campus activities compared to the other schools
gives valuable insight into economic and religious influences on student activism.
Additionally, each selected school is located in one state, Illinois, whereas
Heineman' s university choices span from New York to Michigan.

In its historical

development, Illinois offers something of a microcosm for the United States. Migration
patterns from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries reveal that southern
and central Illinois settlers came from the more conservative southern areas, like the
Tidewater regions, which comprised slave-holders committed to individualism and state
power. The northern section of the state, populated by migrants from the Great Lakes
region, combined diverse cultures, beliefs, and economic orientation. Both groups slowly
moved towards inner or central Illinois, carrying with them clashing ideas and customs,
similar to those fought over during the Civil War. These complex patterns of migration

6 Kenneth J. Heineman, Campus Wars: The Peace Movement at American State Universities in
the Vietnam Era (New York: New York University Press, 1993).
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and settlement continued into the twentieth century, making Illinois a remarkably diverse
state--economically, racially, culturally, and socially. As such it offers ideal terrain for
test cases and generalizations.
This comparative study involves relating not only the universities to one another,
but also relating the university to itself. In short, before one can determine how the
schools interrelate, one must determine how factions within the university fit together.
These "factions" include the student body, the faculty, and the administration. From this
analysis, general campus climates can de deduced, alongside the forces forging or
preventing campus unrest and dissent. The final section offers a synthesis of the findings
at the three universities. Here, these factional relationships will ultimately be compared to
the other sample universities.
Imperative to this study is access to university archives, which include
statistical data as well as correspondence amongst administrative members and faculty.
Archival collections at UIUC and IWU contain such sources, including the school
newspapers, a variety of contemporary newsletters and periodicals issued by student
groups, minutes of faculty bodies, clippings from other newspapers, photographs, posters,
administrative records, pertinent materials within collections of personal papers, and
biographical information on selected individuals, and information concerning local
demographics. Eastern Illinois University's University Archives, though much smaller
and less extensive than the other sample schools, similarly contains correspondence
between administration in the form of letters and memos addressing student conduct,
community complaints, courses of action to be taken, petitions from Illinois interest
groups, and official statements from the administration to the faculty. Also included are

Ii
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actual pamphlets, flyers, and posters confiscated from students and faculty supporting
anti-Vietnam demonstrations. The final pertinent primary source is interviews with
members of all three factions at each university.
I spent endless hours examining such material-balancing opposing viewpoints
and piecing together a fascinating yet complex piece of recent history. The final product
is a mixture of intriguing stories and interconnected subplots that support the main
conclusion that there existed an "aura of rebellion" on college campuses. The Vietnam
War certainly ignited the student protest firestorm, but also underscored a growing sense
of infinite potential among "baby boomers" that continued throughout the sixties.
Analyzing these sources led me to several related conclusions.

First, most campus

activism stemmed not from opposition to the Vietnam War, but rather from disgust with
the university administration. Although administrators eventually learned how to address
student unrest, their initial strategies provoked "radical" protesters and perpetuated
violent clashes. Secondly, growing student apathy towards all societal issues constantly
acted as a thorn in the side of student activism. Even peaceful protests enjoyed relatively
limited participation, thus seriously impeding this generation's once-great potential.
This sociological/historical study teeters on the fence separating these two
disciplines. People's motivations for and reactions to campus unrest necessitate some
sociological study into group behavior and leadership qualities, but cannot detract from
the main question. This study seeks to address the question puzzling historians from
Todd Gitlin to Kenneth Heineman: what drove student rebellion in the sixties?

CHAPTER II
UNNERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Participation of any sort in the University community requires a commitment to
the fundamental human rights of free speech and free inquiry ... We are forced to
coexist with an administration that freely undermines this most basic idea of a
university. The channels have never been open to us. Violence is intolerable.
What tactic is left? 1
The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign stormed through the Vietnam era
as a frustrated minority of student and faculty "radicals" pushed the university to its
breaking point. The Vietnam War, administrative infringements on perceived student
rights, UIUC's military complicity with the U.S. Department of Defense, and numerous
claims of police brutality galvanized anti-establishment advocates and brought the
institution to its knees. While most Illinois college students protested issues in a general
manner, UIUC activism differed because particularly controversial issues actually existed
on campus. While the Indochina conflict provided the push for student activism, the
university's acceptance of government research grants, its invitations to military-related
recruiters, and heavy-handed administrative dealings with protestors offered targets for
"radicals" and provided them opportunities to recruit other students and faculty to join
their violent crusade against the war, the country, and the university.
But the university did not crumble under the weight of student activism. By 1970,
both students and administrators discovered firsthand the terrifying specter of violence
and unofficially agreed to avoid such destructive tactics. Both sides eventually learned

1 Daily

Illini, 12 March 1970, collections of campus newspaper clippings, Campus Unrest File,
1968-72, University Archives, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois (Henceforth
UIUC Archives).
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that democratic processes coupled with administrative restraint not only prevented
violence, but also provided the first steps in achieving Clark Kerr's "multiversity."

Rumblings of Rebellion

Although the bulk of campus disruption occurred between 1967 and 1972, the pot
of rebellion began boiling upon President David Dodds Henry's appointment in 1955.
The former president of Wayne State University followed the controversial resignation of
liberal-minded President George D. Stoddard.

Stoddard's "radical" actions like

recognizing a youth affiliate organization of the Communist Party in 1950 prompted the
Board of Trustees to pass a "vote of no confidence" in 1953. 2 The Board of Trustees,
likely looking to reclaim institutional respectability, hired the safer, more conservative
Henry. 3 At the time, administrators appeared to have a definite bent toward conservatism
and authoritarianism.
A split within the campus community was already evident when the Free Speech
Movement came to UIUC in 1965. Amidst faculty publications labeling former President
Kennedy a communist and administrative resistance to granting students their Berkeleyinspired demand for a free speech area on the quadrangle, 4 the first local Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS) chapter formed and joined the fray. The campus divisions
continued in 1966 with the Board of Trustees (BOT)'s decision to deny recognition of the
W. E. Dubois club, a youth group suspected to be communist-affiliated, set the scene for
2

"Chronology of Campus Protest, ea. 1972," Student Affairs, UIUC Archives.

3 Henry's "conservatism" is reflected in his firing of a biology professor in 1960 for composing an
editorial to the Daily Illini expressing his favoring of pre-marital sex.
4

Jim Holiman, interview by author, November 2003, unrecorded phone interview. Holiman
explained how, following the University ofCalifomia--Berkeley's lead, UIUC students demanded that the
administration allow the exercise of free speech at certain locations on the campus quadrangular.

10
future disenchantment with the administration as faculty in almost every college and
nearly every student opposed the decision. With battle lines drawn and student and
administrative stances established, the war on the administration began.

The Vietnam War Hits Home

National and local events in the fall of 1967 ignited the campus and focused
attention of the Vietnam conflict. President Lyndon B. Johnson's draft expansion policy
infuriated students nation-wide, heightening student awareness and concern about a
foreign war that could now claim their lives if the draft so determined.

Newly

invigorated with fear of induction, students raged against the military machine by
organizing sit-ins and demonstrations against all Vietnam-related corporations and
services.
Their first target was the Champaign draft board. Following the footsteps of the
Draft Resistance Union, a loose grouping of militant anti-draft groups operating on the
fringes of SDS and based in the San Francisco Bay area, Wisconsin, Boston, Cleveland
and elsewhere, UIUC's SDS chapter formed the Champaign-Urbana Draft Resistance
Union (CUDRU) in 1967. This left-wing group instigated numerous marches and sit-ins
on the Champaign Selective Service Board and sponsored the draft card burnings by two
individuals. Inspired students marched to the Selective Service Office where eleven
would be arrested for blocking the Selective Service office doorway in an attempt to
close the building. One month later in November the DRU struck again, when four
members donning hooded death masks and carrying a coffin draped in the U.S. flag
attempted to storm the ballroom where John Hallmack, Illinois draft head, was speaking. 5

5

"Chronology of Campus Protest, ea. 1972," UIUC Archives.
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Students also organized a December 4th 1967 protest including fasting, marching on the
Draft Board, and defiantly returning draft cards. The Ad Hoe Faculty Committee on
Vietnam6 also lent its support, stating, "there was strong sentiment expressed by many at
our last meeting in favor of our members supporting it as individuals."7 The year's final
expression of draft resistance occurred on April 3rd, deemed the National Day of NonCooperation, where over 400 students gathered near the lllini Union to witness five men
hand over their draft cards to Catholic priest Richard Mayer, who stated "I. .. do counsel
and advise those who choose, on moral grounds, to resist the draft. To do otherwise
would be to reject and profane my profession, my heritage, my religious commitment and
my conscience." 8
But the presence of a local draft board and Selective Service leaders were not the
only opportunities for student demonstration in 1967. The administration's invitation to
Dow Chemical Company recruiters in October roused student sentiment and produced
the largest mass protest on UIUC's campus to date. Nearly 400 students, spurred by the
DRU, SDS, and Committee to End the War in Vietnam (CEWV), marched to the
Chemistry building to vent frustration about Dow's military complicity with the U.S.

6 Originally created in 1965 to facilitate occasional discussions and raise funds for the campus
chapter of SDS, this committee included fifteen to twenty faculty members that perceived a growing
student interest the Vietnam conflict.
7

"U of I Faculty Ad Hoe Committee on Vietnam," letter to UIUC community, 29 November
1967, Faculty Organizations, UIUC Archives. The UIUC faculty's increased encouragement of student
protests reflected national trends, according to Willis Rudy. Before 1968, most faculty and students
supported Johnson and the Vietnam policy. By 1968, however, the continued escalation of this
increasingly unpopular international conflict reversed faculty sentiment. Rudy found that professors
supported over two-thirds of student demonstrations, while actively planning one half.
8 Walrus, underground campus newspaper, April 1968, Student Affairs, UIUC Archives Research
Center (henceforth ARC). Campus ministries at many colleges engaged in and encouraged acts of civil
disobedience like draft counseling and draft resistance.
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government. 9 Two hundred demonstrators occupied the Chemistry Building and forced
Dow to cancel all interviews with those students interested in working for Dow. In the
end, authorities arrested eight students, and a university disciplinary committee granted
probation to seven while outright expelling the eighth. 10
While Vietnam-related demonstrations subsided until 1969, the university again
created a situation around which students and faculty rallied: the disciplinary actions
regarding the Dow sit-ins. Temporarily abandoning the traditional disciplinary system,
the administration created a special Committee on Student Discipline comprised of a
heavy majority of college deans and officials that completely excluded student
representation.

The Committee resolved "students participating in future actions

comparable to those that took place on October 25, 1967, will be subject to immediate
dismissal." 11

Heavy student and faculty opposition to a student-free committee that

predetermined "future" penalties regardless of circumstance ensued.

An amendment

requiring student representatives eventually passed and Law Professor Herbert Semmel
addressed the "predetermination" issue, interpreting the statement as the committee's
unlawful seizure of power that illegally mandated all future acts of mass demonstration
would result in the same penalty, regardless of context or circumstance. In a furious
letter to Committee Chairman Orville Bentley, Semmel contended "The effect of the
committee's statement is to prejudge future conduct and must be regarded by the
disciplinary subcommittee as a directive to expel students ... The entire student body has

9

DOW held numerous government defense contracts, particularly the NEPALM production.

10

11

"Chronology of Campus Protest, ea. 1972," UIUC Archives.

"Report of Senate Committee on Student Discipline," 15 November 1967, Senate Committee
Reports and Correspondence File, 1940-83, ARC.
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in effect been placed on conduct probation." Semmel also argued that because such mass
demonstrations were unprecedented and did not substantially interfere with the
university's operation, they therefore did not warrant the punishment of automatic
expulsion. Additionally, such a threat would "have deleterious effects on student conduct
in areas of political and social expression" and deter many from future acts of dissent.
Finally, Semmel abhorred the committee's preferential treatment of faculty members
involved in such demonstrations, as future first-time faculty offenders received warnings,
not dismissal. 12
The draft resistance and Dow chemical sit-ins would be the last Vietnam-related
demonstrations until the fall of 1969. The lapse in Vietnam-related protest in the 196869 school year reflected the "movement's" wavering focus as the Radical Union (RU)
replaced the struggling, fractured local SDS. As SDS nationally lost political focus and
degenerated into the violent Weathermen faction, UIUC chapter leaders dissolved the
organization and created the RU, which concentrated solely on local campus concems. 13
This small yet influential group soon generated waves of student activism that the
university rode until it crashed upon the shores of the May 1970 Student Strike.
Although the Vietnam War undergirded the "days of rage" that drew ever closer, the
administration's blatant and repeated repressions of student rights, coupled with the
institution's military ties, provided the impetus for student activism. Additionally, UIUC

12

Herbert Semmel, letter to Orville Bentley, 15 December 1967, Administrative Subject File,
1963-85, ARC.
13

This information was gathered through various conversations with Michael Pollock, a former
UIUC student and participant in groups like the Radical Union.
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activists exhibited effective organizational skills that allowed groups such as the RU to
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flourish and operate in a coherent, unified manner.

A "Disappointing" Moratorium

11'.

1k

The October 1969 Moratorium signaled the last truly peaceful and intellectual
mass antiwar event focused solely on the Indochina conflict. The cooperative, peaceful
atmosphere during those few magical days resulted directly from the vast consensus
across the university campus about exactly how the event would transpire. Twenty-nine
recognized student and community organizations--from the Civil Rights for Farm
Workers to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom--formed the
Moratorium Coalition and symbolized the wide range of antiwar sentiment. The Faculty
Ad Hoe Committee on Vietnam predictably and energetically threw its support behind
the event. Rationalizing the need for such a Vietnam forum, the committee cited the
university's role as a center of intellectual endeavor, a leader of national sentiment, and a
clarifier of issues about Vietnam; in sum, UIUC must be an intellectual beacon from
which the light of reason illuminated the path of understanding. The Ad Hoe Committee
requested that UIUC Chancellor Jack W. Peltason mimic Rutgers President Mason Gross,
who supported a day of dialogue and cancellation of classes to "demonstrate the role of
the university as teacher and guardian of civilized values, and as the critical and moral
intelligence which compels this country to ponder its courses of action." 14
The nationwide event manifested itself at UIUC in the form of a three-day series
of rallies, Vietnam-related movies, lectures, and guest speakers. The dramatic expression

14

U of I Ad Hoe Faculty Committee on Vietnam, letter to Chancellor Jack Peltason, 24 September
1969, Faculty Organizations, ARC.
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of antiwar sentiment climaxed with a peaceful march of 9000 from the Auditorium to
West Side Park. Police Chief Harvey Shirley marveled at the gathering's size and nature,
stating "I can't recall there being anything like this in the history of the city. And it was a
very orderly march." The only disorder came from two students attempting to disrupt the
marchers by driving over them with their motorcycles, and from one student arrested for
disorderly conduct. This last student's arrest sparked another march, this time to the
police station where 2000 students and faculty passed around a hat to collect bail money
for the accused. 15 The Moratorium, though not unanimously supported, 16 garnered the
largest peaceful gathering of students, faculty, and community members.
But questions about its effectiveness almost immediately surfaced in the Daily
Illini. One student editorial woefully admitted "It [the Moratorium] may have shortened

the war some small fraction of time, perhaps only one day ... it is doubtful that Oct. 15 has
accomplished anything significant in this area." 17

Consequently, a small group of

impatient "radical" students, swept up in the rebellious air swirling around many
campuses, shifted attention to local problems in the hopes of winning large victories and
keeping student morale afloat. Fortunately for the RU the university provided many such
polarizing issues and provided numerous "targets" that heightened student unrest. Issues
such as free speech, student rights, and the university's claim as a "neutral institution"
that resolved itself to abstaining from officially commenting on the Vietnam War,
surfaced as the main source of student discontent.

15

Daily Illini, 16 October 1969.

16

Chancellor Peltason agreed to a thirty-minute cancellation only because of immense student
pressure, and the faculty Senate was similarly not adamant about the Moratorium, questioning the ability of
the university to retain its objectivity about political issues.
17

Daily Illini, 28 October 1969.
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Days of Rage

The 1970 spring semester proved the apex of student unrest, both nationally and
at UIUC. Demands for "institutional neutrality" became the cause around which radical
students rallied, rebelled, and, eventually, would strike. While President Henry and UIUC
Chancellor Jack Peltason preached institutional objectivity regarding politics, The
Walrus, the largest and most widely distributed underground student newspaper at UIUC,
exposed the university's complicity with the U.S. military, as well as their continued
relationship with corporate recruiters who contributed in some capacity to the waging of
the Vietnam conflict.

Students protested UIUC' s relations with military-related

corporations before in the 1967 Dow Chemical sit-ins, but such protest was relatively
peaceful. After two more years of sustained military involvement in Vietnam, however,
frustrations mounted, and "movement" radicals lost patience. After the administration
ignored numerous RU appeals through university channels to assemble a student-faculty
committee to "review the nature and direction of military and 'defense'-related research
on this campus," frustrated students believed the time to strike had come. 18
Three administration-induced events-the discovery of ongoing connections
between UIUC and Illiac IV, a department of defense-funded "supercomputer;" the
presence of GE recruiters; and the banning of "Chicago 7" defense attorney William
Kunstler from speaking on campus--enraged students and propelled the antiwar
movement into unfamiliar territory. While the Vietnam issue provided the glue that held
these three events together, the actual local disruptions resulted from and targeted the
university administration's claim to being a "neutral" institution. A few students threw

18 "The University is not a Neutral Institution," Radical Union flyer, 14 November 1969, People
Publications, ARC.

17

rocks at windows while most wielded a mightier weapon, the pen, but all those involved
targeted the administration's "totalitarian" actions, not national policies on Vietnam.
The offensive began in January when the Daily Illini revealed that the
administration-particularly Daniel Slotnick, Illiac IV project director, and Daniel
Alpert, dean of the Graduate College-purposely hid from the public plans to bring the
supercomputer to campus. The Radical Union wielded these revelations as proof that the
university did not maintain neutrality, and demanded Illiac IV's immediate abolition, as it
supported the military-industrial complex. Both students and faculty also claimed that
funding for the project shifted priorities away human needs, such as education.
Nevertheless, the Faculty Senate's Committee on Educational Policy ignored student
pleas and approved the Illiac project on February 23.

Infuriated, radical students

firebombed the Armory, site of ROTC drilling, causing $2,000 damage. 19
The Illiac IV controversy temporarily subsided due to the more visible, pressing
issue of the administration's invitation to General Electric recruiters. The Geek, a less
widely distributed but more left-wing underground newspaper, trumpeted the call for
anti-GE protests by exposing the corporation's military ties. The paper revealed that GE
was the nation's second-largest defense contractor and helped produce and sell numerous
weapons and fighter planes used in Vietnam. 20 RU planned a rally and demonstration
against GE on March 2, and several students penned editorials in the Daily Illini warning

19 Patrick Kennedy, "Reactions Against the Vietnam War and Military-Related Targets on
Campus: The University of Illinois as a Case Study, 1965-72," Illinois Historical Journal 84 (Summer
1991): 110.

Geek, underground campus newspaper, 23 February 1970, People Publications, ARC. The Geek
claimed that GE received military-related profits totaling over $1.6 billion, with $500,000,000 contributing
directly to the Vietnam effort. The Geek also indicted the company as racist and exploitative of their
employees.
20

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ JI
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"there are strong sentiments against GE on this campus, and that the safety and wellbeing of the recruiter can not be guaranteed." 21
The warnings proved prophetic when GE appeared as scheduled on March 2°d and
met heated student opposition. Students initially occupied the Engineering Building, site
of recruitment, and after discovering the recruiters took an early lunch break, marched on
Chancellor Peltason's office, hurling bricks and rocks and smashing windows along the
way. Police began arresting students, and a standoff resulted at the intersection of Green
and Sixth Street. After regrouping for an RU-sponsored meeting later that evening, the
group of 700 committed radicals resumed the rampage and marched through
Campustown, hitting local businesses and shattering more windows. 22 The activities
resulted in twenty-one arrests.
The ensuing administrative actions further incensed students and unified them in
their defiance.

The Board of Trustees, disregarding Henry's and Peltason's

apprehensions, banned William Kunstler from making a pre-approved appearance March
3ro. The BOT claimed Kunstler's appearance presented a "clear and present danger" in

light of both student riots at Kunstler's previous speaking engagement at the University
of Wisconsin, and the current GE demonstrations on UIUC's campus. 23
UIUC's "radical" minority of 700 demonstrators protesting GE the previous night
swelled to over 4500 persons on March 3 in response to Kunstler's ban.

The RU

distributed leaflets to demonstrators explaining the proper and safest way to march
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through the streets, and anticipated violent police resistance by suggesting that protestors
"Tape a newspaper around each forearm.

It gives some protection against

clubbing ... Carry a hankie or at least paper towel, in case of tear gas." 24 Students scuffled
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with state and local police at a Navy recruiting booth, another frequent site of
demonstrations, and later 4500 students marched from the Union to President Henry's
mansion. Fifty state police officers greeted the marchers by forming an impenetrable
defense line. About 2000 students then marched towards the Armory before turning
towards Campustown and smashing nearly a dozen windows.

The mayors of both

Champaign and Urbana announced a National Guard-enforced 10:30 pm curfew, and
guardsmen cleared the streets at 10:45. Ten more people were arrested for curfew
violations. 25
Chancellor Jack Peltason's statement condemning the "irresponsible behavior of a
small group of our students" and praising the "law enforcement officers for an
outstanding effort in holding the incidents to the point they did" did little to calm the
situation. 26 That same day 1800 people marched through Champaign-Urbana, breaking
windows along the way at Bell Telephone, the Armory, and Green Street. Over 140 more
arrestees lengthened the seemingly unending list of curfew violators while 700 National
Guardsmen surrounded the campus. 27 When GE finally left campus on March 5, they left
behind over $20,000 in damages to both campus and neighborhood property. 28
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While violent protestors comprised a minority of total opposition to
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administrative and BOT decisions, nearly all those sympathetic to their cause blasted the

II

BOT's hypocrisy of allowing GE and other recruiters on campus despite heavy student

If
!i'

opposition, while simultaneously prohibiting Kunstler's appearance in the absence of
such resistance.

Students likewise pointed out that while the administration banned

Kunstler on grounds that his talks induced student unrest elsewhere, such demonstrations
had occurred against GE previously and yet the company did not suffer the same
exclusion. The RU exposed the irony that "the Board has protested the right of free
speech of the GE recruiters yet ignored this right of Kunstler." 29
Sarcastic letters littered the Daily Illini, including one "praising" a particular BOT
member for his "breakthrough in the realm of extra-sensory perception" that allowed him
to "anticipate what another person [Kunstler] will say and what he will advocate." The
university "need concern itself no longer with the issue of freedom of speech." Others
leveled harsh critiques, for example that "intellectual suffocation is not yet dead in
Champaign-Urbana. " 30
Behind the editorials lay an underlying feeling of betrayal; the university was not
politically "neutral" as evidenced by the Illiac IV controversy, the allowance of GE (a
defense department contractor), and the banning of Kunstler, who defended the acts of
seven men accused of inciting the 1968 Democratic National Convention riots in
Chicago.

Many students felt that the BOT prevented the attorney's appearance on

campus because it disagreed with his political views, a statement that, if true, refuted the
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university's claim to "neutrality." The Geek never believed the "neutrality" argument,
editorializing "the so called neutrality of the university is just a line that Chancellor Jack
[Peltason] and the rest of the administrators use to protest the true nature and purpose of
the university, which is to serve and perpetuate the American corporate state." One
student pointed out the irony that "representatives of the business and military
establishments have free access to recruit at this University while an anti-establishment
lawyer, William Kunstler, is denied access to it." 31
The March disturbances signaled the student body's shift away from addressing
national issues and towards the perceived evils in their own university. A demonstration
initially against UIUC's military complicity spiraled into student estrangement from the
administration, as editorial letters addressing the disruptions focused primarily on
administrative decision-making and student exclusion from that process. The student
body's yearning for a Senate with 50 percent student/SO percent faculty representation
was nearly abandoned at this point, signaling the student body's abandonment of change
through official channels of dissent.

Graduate Student Association Chairman John

Ronsvalle complained that the call for this "50-50" Senate went out nearly a year
beforehand, and enjoyed tremendous support from both the undergraduate and graduate
population. Yet since that time, the effort produced only empty promises from ViceChancellor Frampton and sympathetic rhetoric from Peltason. Alienated, frustrated
students like Ronsvalle observed that "many students understandably feel that no
structural change will make a difference on this campus; for a campus senate to have
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effectient [sic] student involvement, it must be credible from the start." He grimly
resolved "I have been reduced to relying solely on prayer at this point." 32
Undergraduate Student Association (UGSA) Chairman Jim Harms similarly
bashed the university, explaining that the Senate would not address the issue of "open
recruiting" until next fall, and that "working through channels, when they exist, is slow or
impossible." Regarding student involvement in the administrative processes, he quipped:
During the crisis situation in the last few days, the administration appealed to the
students to help solve the problem by such means as staying in their dorms,
staying out of crowds, playing it cool, etc. Yet the administration gave no
indication that such help in solving problems such as recruiting, the Kunstler
issue, the Union, the Assembly Hall, ad infinitum, will be asked or wanted.
The school's only concern, according to Harms, was to restore "a good name" to the
university, and return to the status quo. 33
Both undergraduates and graduates continued the assault on the administration's
complete exclusion of students, this time vis-a-vis disciplinary hearings.

The Geek

exposed what it believed were administrative attempts, during both the Dow sit-in
hearings of 1967 and the 1968 hearings following demonstrations by black students in the
Union, to gain complete control over the judicial proceedings and the university. The
hearings related to the March 1970 campus disruptions underwent similar criticism. The
Geek complained that Peltason circumvented the regular disciplinary committees-which

consisted of subcommittees made up of three students and three faculty members-by
convincing several deans to approve a special committee of thirteen deans and two

Daily Illini, 24 March 1970. The "tremendous support" refers to a petition signed by 6000
graduate students during fall registration that supported a 50-50 Senate, and 14,000 undergraduates that
indicated support for such a system at spring registration.
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students. Additionally, Peltason hired an admittedly conservative hearings officer, Albert
Jenner, to prosecute all the cases and make recommendations to the committee.
Student uproar surfaced immediately. The radical newspaper objected on legal
grounds, stating that the Bill of Rights provided a trial by a jury of one's peers and an
administration-heavy committee hardly fit that description. The Geek also argued that
since the university paid for the expensive, nationally renowned Jenner, it should also
foot the bill for a student defender as well.

Not that students approved of Jenner.

Nothing could be further from the truth, as the Geek believed Jenner predisposed against
even nonviolent demonstrations.

The Geek denounced the administration for

disregarding the very channels it expected students to employ, and woefully admitted,
"the people who aremost [sic] directly affected by this institution-students, faculty, and
non-academic employees have no control over the policies and priorities of this
institution." 34 Little did the administration realize its greatest threat had yet to come.

Kent State Strikes the Match
The May 1970 Kent State shootings sparked a call from the National Student
Association for a three-day student strike to oppose all U.S. governmental policies
deemed immoral and oppressive.

uruc students initially adopted the national goals, but

the administration's reactions to the strike and subsequent student protests quickly
transformed the strike from one against Nixon and the American "corporate state" to a
complete condemnation of UIUC governance.

As Ed Pinto, chairman of the

Undergraduate Student Association lamented in retrospect, "the original plan called for a
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strike by universities against President Nixon's policies but here it ended up a strike
against the University administration."35
The strike was originally called for May 6-8; its demands "modestly" included the
termination of U.S. involvement in Cambodia, freedom of all political prisoners, the
termination of the repression of Black Panthers, Nixon's impeachment, and an end to
university complicity with the military. 36 The UGSA and Graduate Student Association
(GSA) avidly supported the strike and implored others to join in their crusade by
simultaneously appealing to the senate and the university to take a political stand and
close the school. President Henry's rare public personal commentary deplored the war in
Southeast Asia, but maintained his commitment to university objectivity, contending that
closing the university accomplished very little, and suggested students employ the proper
channels for expressing dissent. 37 A general statement of Deans and Chancellors from all
three schools in the University of Illinois system deprecating the war and the Kent State
atrocities followed and included over one hundred faculty signatures pledging not to
strike. The university Senate generally agreed with Henry, defeating History Professor
Frederic C. Jaher's resolution stating, "In view of the recent tragic events at Kent State
University and the American invasion of Cambodia, the Champaign-Urbana Senate
supports the current strike on this campus." 38 The Senate instead insisted that the faculty
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adopt Peltason's statement opposing such university action and authorizing faculty to use
class time as forums for discussing current events. 39
The strike, though not officially endorsed by the university, met "approval" at a
rally of 2,000 students (out of a total enrollment of over 30,000) on May 5th. Planned
activities included teach-ins, rallies, marches, pickets on numerous campus buildings, and
attempts to explain to the students and community the strike's goals.
But the likelihood of the community empathizing with strikers plummeted when
the rally group inexplicably resumed the "trashing" that occurred during the GE and
Kunstler demonstrations. Irate student radicals smashed windows and firebombed the
chemistry building, causing thousands of dollars in damage. 40 At least one was arrested
as the administration enlisted the same "repressive" measures as during the March
demonstrations. Administrative officials and Champaign Mayor Virgil Wikoff clamped
down on the student body by setting curfews and requisitioning the National Guard. RU
members wasted little time turning the strike agenda from one focusing on Vietnam to
one aimed against the university. Calling for a "strike for solidarity," the RU stressed
"by striking, the students are asserting their rights in an effort to change the oppressive
nature of the university." 41
That "oppressive nature" reared its ugly head numerous times throughout the
three-day strike.

The deployment of 2000 National Guardsmen and state police to

enforce the May 6th 8 pm curfew resulted in fifty arrests, while picketers at the Union
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loading area faced similar consequences.

In a small-scale version of the Civil War

"Anaconda plan," students picketed campus loading areas to cut off all suppliesincluding food-to the university, forcing it to shut down and heed student demands.
Two arrested professors claimed that loading trucks attempted to back over students, and
one instructor's attempt to stop the vehicles earned him a police beating.

Police

"brutality" only encouraged student violence, as 2500 marched to the police station,
pelting police cars with rocks before meeting stiff resistance from riot-clad police
officers. In all, the day's activities produced 20 arrests, a fact that only enraged students
and augmented campus-wide strike support. 42
Support for the strike consequently grew among university student organizations
and faculty departments.

Cohorts included the UGSA, GSA, Black Coalition, the

Interfratemity Council, the College of Commerce and Business; and the Department of
Anthropology, Linguistics, Political Science, Sociology, and Urban Planning; and the
Graduate Student Association of Philosophy.

Groups like the Urban Planning

Department signaled their participation by holding daylong teach-ins on the quadrangular
on May 7, while the College of Law held fundraisers for the family of Edgar Hoults, a
black man shot and killed by Champaign police officer on April 291h. Law students also
held an informational meeting in the Union addressing any legal matters arising from the
repressive actions of the authorities.

43

Chancellor Peltason's efforts to stem the strike and the violence through press
releases fell on deaf ears.

Responding to the events at the Union loading area, he
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officially announced an 8 pm curfew and the closing of all university buildings for the
evening, while condemning the strike as a "disruption" of campus operation.

The

remarks galvanized the Daily Jllini editorial board, which swiftly attacked Peltason's
statement, attacking his "gross insensitivity" to both national and institutional issues. The
newspaper contended that the university's indifference to the Kent State incident and
black oppression legitimized the "disruptions" and suspension of "normal" university
operations. 44
The second day of the strike witnessed even more support; 10,000 studentsnearly one-third of the total enrollment-gathered on the quad for a peaceful three hour
rally. Ed Pinto, UGSA Chairman, informed the crowd that thirty-seven percent of all
classes had been cancelled and that the class boycott enjoyed nearly 100 percent
effectiveness. This tremendous support, coupled with the administration's refusal to
close the school and its repressive handling of the protestors, prompted calls for the
strike's continuation beyond May 8. Administrative actions later that day facilitated the
strike's prolongation.

Nearly 1000 students gathered at the University Fire Station to

request firefighters lower the flag to half-mast to mourn the Kent State killings. After a
back-and-forth war of words, Paul Doebel, associate director of plants and services,
accompanied by 100 State Police, arrived to "prod and shove" the crowd from the station.
Students then marched to the Student Union upon Doebel' s announcement that that
building's flag would be lowered. Once students dispersed from the Union, however,
National Guardsmen and State Police raised the flag, further vilifying them and the
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administration. 45 Peltason avoided statements or directives supporting the flag lowering;
his reluctance to acknowledge the meaning behind the lowering heightened student
disenchantment. Students complained that "it is highly ironic, but highly predictable
here, that top-level administrators have again retrenched to the argument that they will
not discuss the grievances that have prompted the strike while there is any threat of
force" even though "the University has responded to mass and peaceful attempts at
reform with ... force itself." The same student also supported the Strike Committee's
demand that Doebel be fired due to his handling of the pickets at the Union loading area
the previous day.

To the strike committee, Doebel's actions represented everything

against which the strike was now aimed:
His inability to do anything more than provoke a confrontation between the State
Police, the National Guard and the student body of this campus is only indicative
of the general malaise of insensitivity and actual negligence that characterizes this
University's administration."46
The firing of Doebel was just one of a fresh list of strike demands oriented
towards the administration, rather than national policies. Of the fifteen new stipulations,
only four dealt with military-related issues, and half of those condemned university
complicity with the U.S. military. The remaining eleven issues centered on inadequate
student representation, racist university policies, and acts of police brutality. 47
The UIUC administration finally succumbed to student pressure to formulate a
statement about the strike and the war, though their declarations appeased few radicals.
Both President Henry and Chancellor Peltason aired their apprehension about sending
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more troops into Cambodia, but neither supported the strike.

Though not directly

addressing the strike, Henry did acknowledge the possible inadequacies of current
"channels" of dissent, stating, "if the present University mechanisms are not adequate, we
shall develop others."48
Students, however, felt they had exhausted those "channels" and turned again to
violence. That day, May 8, nine more were arrested at Central Receiving for activating
another installment of the "Anaconda Plan." More faculty similarly grew tired of the
administration's broken promises regarding the effectiveness of university "channels," as
four more departments-English, Physics, Chemistry, and Linguistics-released
statements supporting the strike and calling on the administration to "recognize the
concerns expressed and the issues involved."49
With faculty increasingly turning on the administration, and student support for
the strike intensifying, chaos finally erupted, and university control dissipated with the
infamous May 9 "quad bust." The Illiac IV controversy vengefully returned as daylong
protests against the "supercomputer" ignited skirmishes between students and police and
eventually triggered an order somewhere in the chain of command for the National Guard
and State police to corral over one hundred students-most of whom were not even
demonstrating-onto the quad. After forcing all occupants in the Student Union outside,
National Guardsmen encircled them as well as those already on the quad-innocent or
not, protesting or not-and loaded the students onto three buses enroute to the football
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stadium. Students were held overnight and booked for numerous charges before being
released. 50
The "sweep" even caught the administration off-guard. University officials like
George Frampton, Vice-Chancellor for Campus Affairs, admitted "he did not know why
the students on the Quadrangle were arrested," and even he was denied entrance by "the
guard at the door" to the recently converted jail, formerly known as the stadium. Dean of
Students Hugh M. Satterlee expressed similar befuddlement when he informed the Daily
Illini that a special meeting of deans that very afternoon before the sweep offered an

opportunity "on the part of the deans to deescalate the causes of the student strike."
Satterlee commented on the situation asking, "How do you capture in print the sound of
me throwing up?"51 The total lack of university control did not go undetected by students
and faculty, who criticized "the inability of Chancellor Peltason and his staff to maintain
control of this campus after they had made the decision to allow it to be turned into an
armed camp." 52
After the sweep, a number of students and various faculty members abandoned all
lingering shreds of confidence in the administration. Peltason's efforts to compromise
met formidable resistance by a rather hefty growing minority. Students ridiculed his
authorization of "Liberation classes," where faculty could gear their classes towards
current societal issues while remaining within the parameters of their respective
disciplines. The 6000 students who rallied on the quad scoffed at the chancellor's feeble
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initiatives, mocking him by voting themselves "liberated" from the university. Students
instead applauded a motion by UGSA steering committee member Ted Byers to "secede
from the United States and declare war on the country."

Despite Dean Satterlee's

attempts to quell the discontent leveled at Peltason, the newly "liberated" crowd rejected
his pleas. Although decreasing participation and a sense of "helplessness" overcame the
strike and ushered its demise after May 12, marches targeting the many campus
"repressive" and "racist" institutions continued throughout the month. Edgar Hoults' s
death triggered a march to the police station, while the murders of black students at
Jackson State generated more violence against what the Black Student Association
labeled a "racist" institution. 53
Summer break ended the "days of rage," but the standoff between the
administration and the "radical" factions lingered like a dark cloud over the university.
Law Professor Herb Semmel summarized "radical" student and faculty sentiment just
before the semester's end with this ultimatum:
Is the real cause of disruption the demonstrators or the warmakers? The
University does not exist in a vacuum; we will achieve the optimum conditions
for teaching, learning, and research you [Peltason] desire, peace on this campus,
after we achieve peace in the world, or at least end those wars which our own
government is conducting ... I will join with you in seeking peace on this campus
if you will join with me in seeking peace in the world. 54

Hell Yes, Peace is Best!
When students returned the following fall semester, a cloud of uncertainty still
hovered. Students feared a continuation of the previous spring's violent downpour, and
the increased police presence on campus did little to calm the community. Yet, these
53
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apprehensions never met fruition as the "days of rage" proved a one-time occurrence.
While protests and marches did not completely cease, their nature altered and their
frequency diminished thanks to new administrative tactics and subdued student "radical"
activity.

Increasingly students adopted more peaceful, democratic tactics like

referendums to challenge administrative decisions.

But even as the "movement"

disintegrated nationally and the ranks of the "radicals" shrank, demonstrations against
administrative oppression and military complicity still peppered Champaign-Urbana's
academic landscape.
The school year's first volatile issue, the presence of General Motors recruiters,
signaled a changing attitude among both students and administrators.

Once again

opposed to the administration's disregard for student sentiment regarding open recruiting
on campus, students broke from their previous protest strategy of organizing mass rallies
and picket lines that provoked police action and instead incorporated more democratic
processes and organized coalitions and referendums opposing GM and the entire open
recruiting policy. Students united with local, striking GM auto workers and made several
demands on the university, including "the university end GM's privilege to recruit on
campus until it recognizes the democratic rights and economic needs of all the people it
affects," that the corporation transfer 44 shares of their stock to the local Danville auto
workers strike fund, and that the university establish a policy of open admissions.ss
While the students altered their protest strategy by garnering outside support from
the Danville workers and urging a democratic referendum allowing students to decide on
open recruiting policies, the administration also exhibited a break from their traditional
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handling of such potentially explosive situations. Although university officials refused to
concede to student demands, 56 they responded to the consequent October 23 protest rally
with much more restraint. Leaming from their previous mishandling of student protests,
the administration used the police not as a threat to students but as a deterrent to potential
violence. By simply increasing the police presence and ordering that the authorities not
impede non-violent student activity, the administration gave the students little reason to
employ violent tactics. Consequently, the October 23 protest attracted only 40 picketing
students and one student admitted that police restraint actually lessened participation.
"We'd have a lot of people out here if someone would go downstairs and say 'the police
are out there busting heads.'" 57 That revelation explained the peaceful nature of nearly
every demonstration and protest that followed. Regardless of the reasons behind the
protests, the lack of such tensions as police "brutality" meant "radicals" lacked that
smoking gun they used to recruit so many students last spring.

Additionally,

administrative promises like Doebel's to "work more closely with the people planning a
demonstration" stymied anxieties. 58
As the year progressed the frequency, size, and aims of protests tapered, declined,
and splintered. Administrative and police restraint created few tense situations around
which "radicals" could spin a massive, violent demonstration.

In the absence of

administrative "targets," students returned to protesting national events. Student
Daily Illini, 22 October 1970. Assistant Chancellor Lloyd called the demands "ill-considered"
and lamenting, "I can't think that any responsible person would support their implementation." The
referendum effort met a similar fate as Robert Brown, associate dean of student services and programs,
indicated that Peltason would use such a measure only to gauge student opinion, but not as a binding
agreement.
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attendance at a rally against the 1971 U.S. invasion of Laos, for example, far exceeded
the number of participants in the subsequent march on the Champaign U.S. Army
recruiting station. 59

Demonstrations at local draft boards still enjoyed decent

participation, but the revolving door of draftees and body bags had nearly closed by this
point. The March 1Oth demonstration at the Champaign Selective Service Office attracted
even fewer participants, 60 as it appeared that the draft board and recruiting stations, the
only concrete remaining remnants of student disgust, provided the sole opportunities for
aggressive demonstrations.
In fact, one of the only demonstrations resulting in arrests unsurprisingly occurred
against yet another recruiter, this time the Marines. Over forty students out of 200 total
demonstrators received a free ride to the Champaign County Jail for blocking access to
the Marines table in a May 7th sit-in.61 The arrests stirred the student population, as once
again the administration became the enemy. Students disagreed with the decision to
make arrests, stating "Not only was the decision [to arrest] ill-considered, but the way in
which it was made shows that Chancellor Peltason has little regard for the channels
which he so often praises, or for the administrators who can make those channels work."
This particular editorial expressed dismay that "not one administrator from the dean of
students' office was allowed to take part in the decision" and this omission exposed the
chancellor's complete disrespect for proper "channels." 62
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But it appeared that the time of violent, relatively large demonstrations had
passed. The 1971-72 school year was equally uneventful, and phrases such as "student
apathy" and "student inactivism" dominated the Daily Illini. One student feared that
"there is coming a time when student activists will look back to the 'good old days' of the
sixties when students would protest against the war, racism, oppression, and
environmental pollution." She blamed the lack of "radical" leadership for the decline in
activism, stating "the students who followed the radicals in the fall of 1969 and the spring
of 1970 were simply not radicals themselves."

The UGSA's commitment to a

"cooperative-based alternative society ... popularized the opposition to the war, and while
anti-war activity still goes on, it is not the focal point of the movement like it used to
be." 63 The aimless student reactions to Nixon's resumption of the bombing campaign
over North Vietnam in April 1972 epitomized the disintegration of both the "movement"
and the "radical" faction. The Daily Illini depicted the resulting window-breaking
extravaganza as a "street dance." "The atmosphere at Saturday night's disorder was all
fun and games," lamented one student, and the demand by marching students that the
university end military complicity was groundless. 64 Another student admitted that his
interest in the protests lagged because "at the moment he was drunk" and decided to
direct his energy elsewhere."65
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Although the violent performances of the ensemble of Vietnam-era UIUC
"radicals" grabbed the most attention, they represented a growing choir of antiwar, antiestablishment students and faculty who matured in an environment conducive to fierce
activism. Administrative repression and lies, coupled with the growing sense of rebellion
on campus predestined the university to experience the tumultuous "days of rage" of
1970. Yet as the "movement" splintered and lost focus through the following years, so
too did those fanatic few that attempted to bring a "revolution" to the academic
community.
Not all was lost, however, as students and administrators discovered more suitable
approaches to campus unrest.

Administrators such as Paul Doebel and Chancellor

Peltason helped prevent violent clashes by gradually opening communication lines with
students regarding protests, 66 and law enforcement authorities exhibited much more
restraint in dealing with student activism. But it was the students who took home the
most valuable lesson that navigating the road of change required avoiding potholes of
violence and pursuing avenues of democratic processes.
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CHAPTERilI
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

As a new generation of instructors and pupils passed through Eastern Illinois
University's "ivory towers" during the antiwar era, they encountered a university more
preoccupied with local campus issues than international conflicts.

They discovered

students, faculty, and administrators locked in an epic battle over whether the
traditionally parochial institution should address the Vietnam War, or if it should retain
its isolation from the outside world.

Although a frequently maligned "poor student

leadership" eventually failed to convince the student body to unanimously and actively
oppose the Indochina conflict, this new generation still embraced a certain rebellious air
gripping campuses nationwide. While this small, geographically isolated institution had
little reason to stage massive protests against a distant international conflict, a dictatorial
university administration provided numerous opportunities for student rebellion against
more immediate injustices. The administration's denial of democratic processes led a
small segment of the student body to act out its revolutionary tendencies in the local
arena by focusing on insular problems such as housing conditions, tuition increases, and
questionable campus governance.
While inadequate "radical" student leadership weakened protests against both
local issues and the Vietnam War, a good number of these traditionally conservative
youths and faculty still entered the realm of radicalism. Although the Eastern community
seldom united behind such "rabble rousers," this "radical" center blind-sided the archaic,
totalitarian structure imposed by the unsuspecting President Quincy Doudna.
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Doudna as Dictator

Doudna inherited an expanding, cooperative and friendly university in 1956
thanks to his predecessor, Dr. Robert Buzzard. Academically, Buzzard transformed EIU
from a simple liberal arts teachers college into a full-fledged university by establishing
graduate programs in the early fifties such as the M.S. in Education, while expanding the
variety of undergraduate degrees available. Administratively, Buzzard avoided tension
between faculty and administrators by maintaining a hands-off approach to curricular and
departmental governance.

Department heads maintained relative autonomy regarding

hiring of new faculty, for example, and Buzzard seldom interfered with each
department's operation. 1

The respected president also established the first faculty

governance group, the "Committee of Fifteen," whose recommendations he almost
always followed. 2
But the days of Eastern presidents sending faculty members individual birthday
cards ended on October 1, 1956. When the institution's captain, President Buzzard,
retired, a stubborn, dictatorial Doudna ended Eastern's tranquility, and steered the
campus directly into the waves of rebellion and uncertainty. Marooning the institution on
the shores of the sixties, Doudna continued to centralize power and make autonomous
decisions.

Faculty despised him because of his dramatic departure from Buzzard's

compromising, friendly approach, and the student body, swept up in the whirlwind of

Donald F. Tingley, ed., The Emerging University: A History of Eastern Illinois University, 194974 (Charleston: Eastern Illinois University, 1974), 12.
1

2
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rebellion engulfing campuses nationwide, threw off the blanket of in loco parentis3 and
challenged every attempt by the stubborn Doudna to impede their freedoms.
Doudna, however, cannot be held completely responsible for the deterioration of
relations between his position as president and the faculty and students. He encountered
an unprecedented influx of new students and faculty with rebellious attitudes.
Additionally, the university unwisely placed too much stock in Doudna's experiences in
rural settings and virtually ignored the fact that this particular presidential candidate had
heavy administrative experienced and little time in a college classroom. For a teacher's
college on the brink of a societal wake-up call, Doudna fit in like a square peg in a round
hole.
In sum, Doudna's career spanned twenty-nine years prior to his presidency with

only seven years of teaching experience, all of which came at the high school level. He
spent his entire life in small Wisconsin towns similar to Charleston in size, receiving his
Ph.D. in economics in 1948 from the University of Wisconsin. While completing his
graduate work, Doudna worked in the high school sector, teaching Chemistry his first
seven years out of college while attaining administrative positions at the secondary level
for the next twelve.

His first collegiate administrative experience came in 1945 at

Wisconsin State College at Stevens Point, where he held the title "Dean of
Administration" for ten years until his interview at Eastem. 4

With only eleven years of

exposure to the university setting, Doudna could not help feel a little overwhelmed when

3 In Loco Parentis was a clause in university contracts that required the university to act as parents
to the students, resulting in enforcing morals, limiting dorm visitation, etc. This came under direct attack
during the sixties and was the focus of many student protests.
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he took the presidential reigns of Eastern Illinois University, especially when the student
enrollment jumped from a little over 2,000 in 1956 to over 8,000 by the time of his
i.

retirement in 1971. 5
Doudna also faced the daunting task of balancing requests and demands of both
veteran and rookie teachers. Many department heads, for example, reacted negatively to
Doudna's attempts to limit their power since over one-fourth had held their respective
positions throughout the entire Buzzard administration.

The fact that first-year

instructors comprised one-fourth of the entire Eastern faculty in 1956 similarly strained
the administrative tightrope along which Doudna walked. 6
Rather than appease the faculty, however, Doudna chose to lay down the hammer
of presidential prerogative. The new president wasted little time centralizing control and
alienating the faculty by leashing individual departments and interfering with the Faculty
Senate.

Doudna spread his tentacles through department chairpersons by renewing

positions on an annual basis and forcing faculty to adhere to his demands. Lacking a
faculty union or constitution, Doudna' s pawns kept untenured faculty in check, and as
former faculty member Donald Tingley recalled, "the departments themselves were to
have no autonomy." 7
Doudna similarly infiltrated the Faculty Senate by "highly recommending" the
selection of administrators to voting positions within this governing body.

Already

stripped of their autonomy, Doudna's secrecy regarding the appointment of staff

5 Tingley,
6

Ibid., 38.

7
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members in 1967 and his disregard for the faculty's opposition to an activity fee increase
incensed the faculty. 8 Finally, Doudna ignored the Faculty Senate's advice and sought to
establish an ROTC program on campus,. though the U.S. Army ultimately refused his
request, citing EIU' s meager resources compared to other possible institutions in housing
such a program. 9
Besides dealing with a relatively young faculty accustomed to hands-off
presidential practices, Doudna also encountered a much more independent-minded
student body, especially during the later sixties. Previously in the forties and fifties, the
university mantra revolved around "unity," and students generally accepted in loco

parentis. Students garnered additional responsibilities and power positions not because
they demanded them, but because the administration and faculty felt such structure was
appropriate. 10
However Eastern' s long tradition of institutional "unity" began crumbling in the
late fifties and early sixties due to tremendous growth that stretched the campus and
alienated students from administrators. 11 Feeling abandoned by the university, students
questioned the administration's right to lord over them and decide their best interests.
Consequently, in loco parentis came under heated attack in the early sixties, as the
student body gradually demanded more autonomy regarding their own destiny and the
destiny of the university. 12

8
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The obdurate president refused to abandon in loco parentis and felt it was a
"disservice" to students to let them sit on decision-making committees. Denying requests
for meaningful student participation in university governance, Doudna alienated the
student body, which later turned to their student government for help. First titled the
Student Association and later named the Student Senate, this body originally worked
cooperatively with the administration, but only on minor issues like organizing school
dances. Although the student government experienced little success in affecting change
in university policy in the fifties, Doudna's repressive actions opened the doors for
greater protests in the sixties.

Nationwide demands for "student rights" further

galvanized Eastern students politically as pupils tirelessly advocated changes in housing
policies, student representation on disciplinary committees, and changes to the academic
calendar. 13
As the Vietnam War ensued and anti-Vietnam demonstrations rattled campuses
from California to New York, Eastern Illinois University seemed another likely place for
such rebellion. One survey of major issues before and after the formation of a student
government, for example, revealed "the general feeling of trust and cooperation between
students and university officials during much of the fifties, the increasing feeling of
antagonism, even open distrust, beginning late in the fifties and extending throughout the
sixties." 14 It was no coincidence that student "antagonism" began in the late fifties, the
same time Doudna' s dictatorial reign commenced.

Doudna' s interference with the

student government's restructuring, for example, brought accusations of "taking upon
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Tingley, 92-93.
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itself [the administration] the task of reorganizing student government without so much
as a 'howdy-do' to the officers of that government." Students sarcastically mocked the
president, with comments such as "the great and benevolent Wizard of EID has
spoken." 15 When the student body president asked for Doudna's retirement in 1968, the
hard-line president's refusal to defend his actions and his admission to charges of
ignoring student opinion that he felt did not reflect the "best interest of the University as a
whole" 16 cemented his reputation as a "dictator."

A Divided University

When the anti-Vietnam Movement exploded onto the college scene sometime
between 1967 and 1968, EID was already embroiled in a turf war between President
Doudna and the students and faculty.

Although infected with the bug of rebellion,

students showed few symptoms of the disease when confronted by the Vietnam War.
The Indochina conflict had little relevance to the insular institution, as most EID students
did not see their provincial community directly involved or threatened by the events
occurring halfway around the world. The fiercest student antiwar demonstrations, after
all, occurred at large, research-oriented institutions like University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign (UIDC), a school directly assisting the Federal Government by researching
information used in Vietnam.
Instead, Eastern's major battles occurred much closer, specifically within the
campus itself. Public outcry against the Indochina conflict took a backseat to student
government difficulties and anti-administration editorials.
15
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failed to arouse substantial interest in a local EIU chapter 17 as students seemed more
concerned with "oppressive" university administrative policies.

Besides antagonism

between university factions, the factions themselves-particularly students-remained
ideologically divided over their role in society and in university governance. These
divisions partly existed because of the "culture clash" of attitudes and ideas that resulted
from the various backgrounds of students, 18 and likely paralyzed any possibility of
unified student agreement.
Eastern entered the 1969-70 school year enclosed in an atmosphere hardly
conducive to cohesive antiwar activism. Eastern's experiences during the October 15
Moratorium best reflected the university's internal friction. On the eve of the largest oneday national protest in history and EIU's largest antiwar protest to date, rifts among the
event's organizers-especially the students--impaired the occasion's potential. Student
schisms over the Indochina conflict and the university's proper role in politics produced a
subdued moratorium in which more faculty than students participated. In fact, EIU's
Student Senate remained sharply divided over the Vietnam War 19 and actually officially
supported a campus ROTC. 20 Although they agreed to "endorse and co-ordinate"
Eastern's participation, senators expressed doubts about holding the event and exposed
their conservative attitude towards student protest by equating demonstrations to "other
such illegal activities." Some senators, including future Senate President Larry Stuffle,
17 Eastern News, 5 November 1968. Of the two SDS meetings on campus, attendance ranged
from 35-40 students, respectively.
18
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even opposed university class cancellation and insisted that the moratorium be "up to
those who want to participate." 21 The resignation of Student Senate President Ken Miller
a day before the moratorium iced the crumbling cake of unity within the student
government; Miller concluded that "the present situation [in the Senate] of pettiness,
bickering, and backstabbing is intolerable to me." 22
The student leadership's self-destruction reflected the student body's preexisting
doubts about the moratorium and the war. Many voiced opinions both for and against the
war, and editorials in the Daily Eastern News reflected divisions within the student body.
Student H.O. Pinther spoke for campus hawks:
You, who choose not to fight for your country, put your tail between your legs,
snap on your collar and whine loudly so all will know you for what you are. For
those of courage and principal, who want to be free, stand up for total and
complete victory. 23
Winfield Nash, responding directly to Pinther's accusations of cowardice, argued, "I
would say this is true, but even so, it is better than putting your country before your logic,
and being led around by a leash of propaganda," 24 implying that the U.S. government was
misleading its citizens about the war's conduct and progress in order to paint a rosier
picture and boost public approval. An even harsher stance came from Student Senate
Speaker Kenneth Midkiff, also responding to Pinther's editorial:
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Every aspect of the Vietnam War is contrary to the American tradition. America
has always represented freedom, independence, love and happiness, which are the
very things the planners and participants of the moratorium are extolling. Ask
yourselves then, you who are crying 'traitor, un-American and un-patriotic,' who
is it that is unpatriotic, the opponents or the supporters of the War in Vietnam? 25
Disagreements over the war by both the student populace and the Student Senate
led to disenchantment with the proposed class boycott. The Interfratemity Council (IFC)
refused to lend its support, stating "We're not endorsing the war at all, we just believe
there is a time and place for everything." 26 Doubts about student sincerity also peppered
the campus newspaper. Students wondered whether protesters like Midkiff would "walk
the walk" so to speak, and fully support or participate in the Moratorium. Eastern News
opinionated editorials expressed fears that students would interpret the class cancellation
as simply a vacation, rather than attend the Moratorium activities and express genuine
aspirations for total U.S. withdrawal. Concerned students claimed that since two-thirds
of all EIU students were not in class at a given time, a better message would be sent if
these students voluntarily gave up free time to attend Moratorium activities, rather than
attending merely as an excuse to skip class. 27
Such student divisions and apprehensions left the Moratorium in the hands of the
faculty. Already advocating student dissent by offering draft counseling and intentionally
assigning higher grades so students qualified for draft deferments, 28 a small core of
"radical" instructors blazed the antiwar protest trail by organizing or participating in all
of the moratorium's activities. Philosophy Professor Dr. Robert Harford spearheaded
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faculty activism and created an ad hoe Faculty Moratorium Committee to construct
official faculty policy endorsing the Moratorium's activities and encouraging faculty
involvement. The group circulated a petition to faculty members imploring their support
by either signing a letter to President Nixon denouncing the war, or by actively
participating in the Moratorium. This could be done by joining the faculty protest march,
devoting the entire class period to Vietnam discussion, or simply making an initial
classroom statement regarding the Vietnam War, which was acceptable for professors as
"citizen-professors." 29 Finally, while the Student Senate remained content with subdued
activities like movies and lectures, the faculty organized the day's only protest march. 30
Like the students, these activist faculty members also had their share of critics.
Anthropology Professor Lloyd Collins, for example, opposed the moratorium, insisting
that such unpatriotic action provided the Viet Cong with psychological warfare and
propaganda, possibly resulting in more U.S. casualties. He also feared active soldiers,
upon hearing the anti-Vietnam action back home, would be demoralized and thus have
their survivability weakened. 31 History professor Dr. Lawrence R. Nichols also opposed
faculty participation, but on less political grounds than Collins; faculty, Nichols argued,
who used class time to discuss the incident, as Barford encouraged, violated the

29 [Robert Barford], "EIU Faculty Vietnam Moratorium Committee: An Appeal to Conscience,"
memorandum to the EIU faculty community, 15 October 1969, Booth Library, Eastern Illinois University,
Charleston, Illinois (henceforth "Booth").
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American Association of American Professors (AAUP) teacher responsibilities by
wrongly using their position to encourage propaganda and indoctrination. 32
Although the Faculty Senate mirrored the Student Senate in opposing a class
boycott, a well-organized day of events still occurred thanks to a faculty organization
specifically created to plan the one-day event. Student organizers, by contrast, never
formed a "moratorium committee" completely independent from the student government.
Instead, the Student Senate had the difficult task of coordinating an antiwar event while
also representing the best interests of their constituents--the students, who already
expressed disagreement over the class boycott and the war itself. Under the awkward
circumstances, the Student Senate proved incapable of fully supporting an event that so
obviously split the student body.
The animosity among the students aided President Doudna' s decision to reject
class cancellation. Doudna' s advisory council--consisting of faculty chairpersons and
student senate representatives--echoed student fears that many would not take the day
seriously and simply perceive it as a vacation. It was radical faculty, after all, who
instigated the Moratorium, while the students had circulated no petitions and had not yet
mustered a single public demonstration.

Doudna agreed.

His campus community

memorandum demanded that traditional rules and regulations regarding class absences be
followed, meaning if a student missed class he/she would be penalized at the teacher's
discretion. The faculty, however, did not receive such leeway. Doudna explicitly stated
that "faculty members have the same obligation to hold their classes as students have to
attend them, except that their obligation is contractual," implying that expectations for
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faculty to behave accordingly were higher. 33 Surprisingly little outcry resulted from
Doudna' s decision to ignore the Moratorium.

Even the fact that administrators

comprised over 50 percent of his "democratic" twelve-person advisory council drew only
minimal criticism. 34
Although Moratorium activities occurred, they received minimal student support.
Faculty speakers headed six of the eleven total lecture sessions, while students spoke at
only two. Only 308 students (4%) out of an enrollment exceeding 7000 signed a promoratorium Eastern News advertisement, as many students apparently agreed that the
university was not the proper setting for expressing discontent or did not approve of the
ad. 35 A letter from the vice-president for Instruction revealed "a slight, but not alarming
decrease [in class attendance] for the entire university," and found that no instructors
missed classes because of Moratorium activity. 36 While one-third of UIUC's campus
attended the day's events, EIU assembled no more than five hundred for a candlelight
procession. Even that event met heated opposition from several dorm residents who
hurled both obscenities and projectiles at the marchers as the procession winded around
the dorms. 37
Recognizing the inadequate student interest and leadership regarding the October
Moratorium, EIU quickly abandoned hope for a repeat Moratorium in November and
students turned instead to individual protest. Blaming term papers and tests for the
33 Quincy Doudna, "Memorandum to the University Community," Office of the President, 10
October 1969, Booth.
34
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spotty, delayed organization, student Moratorium organizers stated, "this month's
[November's] activities will be more on an individual basis, sort of a 'personal thing."'
The schedule of events was noticeably shorter than October, with only three speakers, a
march and rally, and a reading of Illinois casualties. Concerns over student commitment
continued, and the moratorium suffered a slow, painful death. The extremely low student
turnout at the November 11 Veterans Day memorial service for U.S. casualties of
Vietnam prompted student Clyde Fazenbaker to attribute the disappointing attendance to
a plurality of EIU students "who don't give a damn, or wear a False Fac;ade." In other
words, students articulate concerns about the welfare of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam, yet fail
to actually act on those emotions and beliefs through physical attendance at antiwar
events. 38
The Eastern News nailed the coffin shut by including no articles about the
November 14th events and failing to publicize December moratorium happenings until
four days after they commenced. 39 The Vietnam War seemed more a fantasy than reality
to most Eastern students, but that would soon change.

Raising Fees and Lowering Flags
As the 1970 spring semester witnessed more internal bickering and controversy
that deflated antiwar activity, local campus issues again surfaced as targets of student
disaffection. Created in 1970, Eastern's first and only underground newspaper, The
Fertilizer, reflected the elevation of local concerns over national ones.

Printed in

38 Eastern News, 14 November 1969. After the October moratorium, the Eastern News started
corresponding with a GI stationed in Saigon to get firsthand accounts to the war and reactions to antiwar
activity in the U.S. Later that year, at least one Greek organization sent Christmas cards to Vietnam
soldiers.
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Champaign and delivered and distributed by several "anonymous" Eastern faculty
members,

40

this paper best represented the concerns of more "radical" students and

faculty. A content analysis reveals that anti-administration articles more than doubled
those about Vietnam, while the remainder focused mostly on other neighborhood issues
concerning student rights, racism, drugs, and women's liberation. 41
But it was the proposed dorm fee increase that prompted the animal of massive
student activism to finally brandish its claws in March. Despite promises to keep dorm
fees constant, Doudna' s decision to raise them directly affected all on-campus dwellers
and ignited a fiery response. Over 350 students demanded and attained a meeting with
Housing Director Albert Green to vent frustration about what students interpreted as
blatant administrative dishonesty. Meanwhile, Doudna exposed his distance from student
concerns by commenting: "I was surprised to read in the paper this morning about this
meeting ... I thought the question was settled." 42 The fact the university president did not
even realize that a subordinate administrator had conducted such a meeting only further
convinced students of Doudna' s incompetence.
Finally united behind a common problem and against a common enemy, Student
Senate Speaker Ken Midkiff led 2000 students--nearly one-third of the total enrollment-in a march to Doudna' s house. These students believed that the dorm fee fiasco revealed
an inept, dictatorial administrator, and that the sequence of events leading to this
unprecedented protest justified demands for a "50/50" government that would grant
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students and faculty more decision-making power. 43 Carl Greeson, father of the "50150"
plan, captured the feelings of other student leaders, stating, "we are beginning to
understand after one or two years in student government that the whole problem is that
the university is run by one man, Doudna."44 The Student Senate again demanded
Doudna' s resignation, signaling both its lack of confidence in his ability and a refusal to
recognize his authority. 45
Though the protest achieved unprecedented participation, its aims never met
fruition. Doudna virtually ignored the marchers, the fees continued to rise, and no "5050" government resulted. Charges of poor leadership littered editorials in the Eastern
News, where one anonymous writer created a sarcastic march "chant" that lambasted the

protest's poor organization and lack of specific goals. He observed that upon arriving at
Doudna's house, they merely "yell and stomp, and shout and scream," and possessed no
contingent plan when Doudna refused their demands, only to "call him a dirty old
man."46
The disgruntled writer's point had merit. The Student Senate, for example, never
queried the student body on their proposal demanding Doudna' s retirement.

For a

supposedly "representative" group, the Senate never polled its constituents to ensure it
acted in their best interests. Editorials both for and against the motion spattered the
Eastern News, casting shadows of doubt over the Senate's decision. One student, for

43 This "50-50" idea, prevalent at UIUC as well, referred to creating a university government of
fifty percent student and fifty percent faculty representation.
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example, defended Doudna, stating "The major fallacy here is that everyone still holds
Doudna accountable for everything within the university ... Doudna's real problem is
getting his administrators to take additional responsibility which he has offered them.
i'

11

Clearly, the question of his resigning is out of the question." 47

Despite possible

substantial resistance to demands from the Senate for Doudna' s retirement, the Student
Senate passed the motion anyway, 17-8-1. Citing what they considered "dangers to
academic freedom," the Senate accused Doudna of "censorship of the campus news
media, stagnation of the university's communication channels and unfair treatment meted
out to professional men. " 48
Poor leadership and undemocratic processes radiating from the Student Senate
alienated the student body, making it even more disinclined to adhere to Senateorganized protests that centered on non-university issues, like an international conflict.
While an almost deterministic desire to protest something, indeed anything, pervaded the
college culture, the Vietnam War fell to the background. "The only reason that Eastern
didn't have a war protest this month [April] is simple.

In spite of the protest sub-

culture ... the Viet Nam war has become ... a dead issue," quipped one disappointed
columnist. 49
Nevertheless, the dorm fee protests of March 1970 catapulted Eastern students
onto the wave of student activism. When the May 4th 1970 Kent State shootings occurred,
students were still in a hyped state over the previous Eastern protests and attempted to
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bring a similar intensity in opposition to those tragic events in Ohio. Additionally, the
previously parochial EIU community felt, closer than ever, the shockwaves of the
previously distant and detached Vietnam conflict.

No longer was campus violence

confined to major east or west coast schools but instead became a frightening possibility
even in the Midwest. As with the dorm fee increase, murder on midwestem college
campuses directly affected EIU students, and they responded with intensity by finally
commandeering the ship of antiwar protest navigated for so long by the faculty.
The reasoning for this shift from faculty to student-led antiwar activity is
logical-students had been killed for protesting the Vietnam War.

Other students,

therefore, were both sympathetic towards the victims and upset that such actions could
occur. Additionally, students blamed the Vietnam War for the catastrophe, reasoning that
if the U.S. were not involved in the foreign dispute, the killings would not have occurred.
To other students, Kent State victims became martyrs symbolizing the tragedies that the
Vietnam War wrought on American civilians as well as soldiers. Such sentiment resulted
in a series of student-led events including a candlelight procession memorializing the
victims, student editorials condemning the National Guardsmen who fired upon students,
and calls from the EIU College Democrats for a two-day student strike. 50 One student, in
a rare display of extreme discontent, was arrested and convicted of flag desecration by
covering the stars of the American flag with a swastika and writing "Kent State" across
the stripes, which he then proceeded to hang from his dorm window. 51
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Yet, questionable decisions by the student government again foiled student unity.
One student blasted the Student Senate's hasty statement that "this country is quickly
evolving into an oppressive, military state, aided and condoned by the President of the
United States." 52

The confused respondent pondered how the Senate could pass

judgment so quickly and reminded readers that the guardsmen responsible for the
shootings deserved an opportunity to tell their story. 53
The distance between Senate decisions and student desires revealed itself during
the tensest event of this period and the only instance of potential violence: the "flag
controversy." As at other schools, students implored the administration-specifically
Doudna-to lower the flag to half-staff to mourn the Kent State victims. Responding
simultaneously to the U.S. invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State shootings, nearly
250 EIU students assembled at the university flagpole where Doudna lowered the flag to
half-staff that day only to "deplore the hatred and conflict rampant on college campuses
and throughout the world today." 54
But divisions within the student body resurfaced to create a complex situation for
Doudna. While some students demanded the flag stay lowered for the duration of the
Vietnam War, decrying the ongoing death of college-aged U.S. citizen-soldiers, this
request met considerable opposition from other students as the charge of a "false fa~ade"
remained. This latter group of students sarcastically labeled the protesters "children of
the apocalypse" and was convinced that the flagpole protesters gathered only because
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they were "looking for something to do on a nice Tuesday aftemoon." 55 Then Resident
Director Louis Hencken supported this belief by pointing out that out of over 7000 total
students, there were only 200-300 protesters at the flagpole. 56 If Eastern students indeed
cared so passionately about the rising Vietnam death toll, the paltry attendance at the
flagpole certainly did not convince the skeptics.
There would be no student body backlash this time as the Student Senate, terrified
of escalating a potentially violent situation, agreed to hold an all-campus referendum to
decide the matter. Doudna, abreast of the violent student protests occurring just up the
road in Champaign, agreed, and the Senate set up polling places and encouraged all
members of the university to participate.

Despite the Student Senate's unforgiving

condemnation of both the Kent State incident and the nation, nearly 50 percent of the
university community jammed the voting booths to reveal the discrepancy between the
Senate "radicals" and the students themselves.

Only 34 percent of students favored

keeping the flag at half-staff, and 86 percent of faculty and civil service voters favored
the flag's return to the top of the pole. 57 These results halted the rising sea of Eastern
student activism as the Kent State and Vietnam issues faded quickly.

A Wave Recedes

Kent State and its aftermath shocked EIU more than it enraged and radicalized it.
It served as a wake-up call to the Eastern community that the lack of democratic
processes made violent occurrences not only possible, but even probable. Doudna and
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the Student Senate, perhaps conscious of student backlash from their past mistakes,
recognized the national and local upward swing of student activism and avoided feeding
this growing monster of rebellious youth. Instead, the student leadership and
administration's unprecedented agreement to hold a legally binding referendum
prevented any confrontations that might spiral out of control.

Employing such

democratic methods lessened potential for "radical" or violent backlash against an
oppressive, "dictatorial" regime.
The period's only other rally besides the flagpole gathering, for example,
occurred May I 0, 1970 when 500 students gathered on the Booth Library Quad. The
meeting encouraged a non-violent program to address current societal ills, and one
speaker contended "intellectual action is much better than physical action because anyone
can flex a muscle." The mass assembly advocated "understanding sessions" to promote
relations between all campus groups (Greek, independent, radical conservative), and
urged students to orient classroom discussions towards these problems. The rally also
encouraged heightened political awareness and participation at the state and national
level, and announced a local door-to-door campaign and a telephone canvass asking
support for pertinent bills currently in Congress. 58 Eastern students and faculty ensured a
nonviolent response to national issues and prevented campus disorder by immediately
employing democratic tactics.
As the Illinois legislature called all public university presidents to discuss student
protests that summer, community groups expressed fears about future campus violence.
To ensure the administration reacted accordingly, the Mt. Vernon Chamber of Commerce
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circulated a petition on 26 May 1970 signed by 4470 citizens denouncing the
"communistic tactics" employed by EIU students regarding flag desecration, and stated
that each student's right to learn should not be infringed by such un-American zealots. 59
The Rich Township Republican Organization similarly felt that it was every student's
right to attend class as well as not attend, and the university should not contribute to
"intellectual radicalism" by suggesting that protesting is more important than education. 60
Eastern' s preexisting apprehensions about violence and protests made such fears
unfounded, but the community still made efforts to ensure a peaceful atmosphere. Both
Doudna and the Student Senate strove to employ more democratic processes since such
tactics effectively deflated "radical" initiatives the previous semester. Doudna announced
plans to place students on several major policy-making councils, including Academic
Affairs, Teacher Education, and University Planning and Budget. 61 The Student Senate
caught the "democratic spirit" by once again employing a referendum to help settle the
debate over implementing term limits for university presidents. Although not a binding
agreement as before, students stressed the importance of becoming more involved in the
decision-making process by voting.

"Today," wrote one student, "young people are

attempting to become an involved and concerned force in our society.

This effort

manifests itself in many ways in the university community." 62

59 Bob Poisall, "Mount Vernon Chamber of Commerce Petition," letter and accompanying petition
to President Doudna regarding student activism, Office of the President, 29 May 1970, Booth.
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Such maneuvers to avoid protests and demonstrations proved unnecessary as EIU
lacked both the organizational vehicles that were present at schools like UIUC, and the
unity of "radical" students, both necessary components to successful activism. The
Student Senate resumed its infighting and further alienated the student body. Editorials
complained that student leaders were "apathetic" and disrespectful of their constituents'
concerns, 63 and the Senate continued to "play government" as several senators
"boycotted" by absenting themselves to deny quorum and shut down the Senate.
Students blasted the entire boycott situation and contended it "serves the purpose of
dramatizing the displeasure of the nine senators [who boycotted], but its disruptive effect
on necessary senate activity will only hurt the student body in the long run." 64 The
impeachment of Senate President Larry Stuffle for alleged voter fraud the previous spring
widened the gulf of disunity and swallowed whatever remained of the governing body's
reputation. 65
Besides constitutional and ethical issues, a conservative backlash tore the Senate
apart as the impeached Stuffle referred to the Senate as "that paranoid panorama of
political misfits" firmly allied with the "radicals."

Editorials mocked the "freak

community," as the EIU radicals were labeled, chastising its "heckling" of Stuffle. One
editorial stated "it became apparent that those people only attended for the purpose of catcalling, disruption, and making a general nuisance of themselves." 66 Any respect for
campus "radicals" that existed beforehand quickly dissipated.
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These overlapping divisions crushed student unification and continued to haunt
the campus throughout the following three semesters. The Student Senate scuffled over
ideology and governmental procedure while the student body vented frustrations over the
Senate's meaningless turf wars. A fragmented student leadership coupled with deficient
faith in that governing body to accomplish meaningful change blurred the future of
student activism at EIU. Eastern radicals attempted to initiate another moratorium in
April 1971, for example, but never garnered the support enjoyed during its parent event
in October 1969. The Senate just barely granted official endorsement, voting 12-11-1 to
help organize the event, 67 and participation at the various marches, processions, and
lectures were comparatively lower. While 500 marched with candles in 1969, only 200
participated now, and again dorm residents yelled threats such as "why don't you go back
to Urbana where you came from?" or "Come up here and make peace," and finally "G---n it, this makes me so mad. My father's a general." The 300 who marched uptown to the
Square met a few hecklers, but overall the community reaction was one of "amused
tolerance," according to the Eastern News. 68
The 1971 moratorium appeared to be the antiwar movement's last gasp. Few took
the protest seriously, and the campus quiet lulled the community into a sense of serenity.
The draft's gradual discontinuation further convinced the university and the students that
EIU might escape the nation's most tumultuous college protest period without so much as
a riot-clad police officer or a disruption of normal activities. They were wrong on both
counts.
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A Bang, Not a Whimper

The Vietnam War's conclusion seemed all but official in 1972 as EID students
and faculty discussed the return of POW' s and the termination of the draft. Despite
Doudna' s retirement after the 1970-71 school year, local issues that directly affected the
students continued to dominate the Eastern News, including a rally to oppose a tuition
hike by the governor, 69 and the controversy over alleged discrimination by the county
clerk against the newly enfranchised student population. 70 But instead of a whimper,
Eastern Illinois University bid farewell to the antiwar era with a bang by staging the
school's most aggressive antiwar protests and demonstrations in the spring of 1972.
Although two full years behind the national trend, the EIU antiwar movement climaxed
with illegal marches requiring both local and State police enforcement. The Student
Senate's prior ineptitude in formulating any unified, meaningful opposition to the war or
the administration prompted inpatient "radical" activists to mirror their UIUC brethren
and organize marches and present demands to the university president in response to
Nixon's escalation of the war in May.
The student body's reaction to the arrest of three students in April for "illegally
demonstrating" the Vietnam War inside a campus building foreshadowed the rising tide
of anti-administration sentiment. On April 21, in cooperation with schools throughout
the nation, Eastern students organized a day of antiwar activities which included three
"idea-exchanging" sessions in the Library about how students could help end the
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Vietnam War, and one protest in the University Union. 71 But when the university police

I',

I

arrested several students for picketing inside the building, Eastern students laid blame on
the administration's doorstep, dismissing the charges as "administrative pettiness,
stupidity, and close-mindedness." Despite the lack of protests and the desire among all
university factions to avoid violence and demonstrations, claimed the student, "the
ridiculous move ... points to the insecurity of administrators on this campus and
elsewhere-an insecurity brought on by irrationality.',n
Although the university eventually dropped charges against the students, the
incident ignited campus activism and prompted students to finally stand up and oppose
the "system.'' Part of that "system" included the Federal government. Nixon's mining
of six North Vietnamese ports in May of 1972 propelled student activists out of their
comfortable abodes and onto the road of dissent. That night, May 1Oth, 500 students
spontaneously spilled onto Lincoln Avenue, the main road through Charleston, and
proceeded to block the intersection at Fourth Street, a main street leading through
campus. Approximately forty state, local, and campus riot-clad police confronted the
demonstrators and threatened arrest if the bottleneck continued.

200 students then

recrossed the street, creating a riot line. Protesters requested that motorists help by
"accidentally" encountering car trouble and stalling in the middle of the road, but this
tactic met mixed responses. Some complied while others drove through students, as one
eyewitness attested. "When the car cleared the bulk of the protesters blocking it," the
unidentified participant explained, "there were two students who had been forced onto
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the hood.

They were immediately thrown off after the driver speeded up and then

i
I

I'

slammed on his brakes throwing them to the pavement."

Although no arrests occurred

and students eventually dispersed, the demonstrations created not only inconvenience for
motorists, but resurgent debate over the "dead issue" of Vietnam. 73
The following day, student protest leaders presented first-year University
President Gilbert Fite with a list of demands. As had been the case all along at EIU, the
list focused specifically on instilling campus changes, although the demands were far
from unique to Eastern Illinois University as schools nationwide had made similar
requests.

Most of the six demands revolved around solely local concerns, such as

relieving administrative "repression" including dorm and tuition freezes, elimination of
rules regulating off-campus housing, and elimination of "unnecessary administrative
posts." Vietnam-related concerns also peppered the list, including the disarmament of
police, a ban on military recruiters, the formation of a Peace Foundation on campus,
university endorsement of the current nationwide protest, and condemnation of the recent
escalation of the Vietnam War. 74
Demonstrations continued the following two days, as protests devolved into
"trashing" and rock-throwing extravaganzas causing $600 damage to campus property.
Some fifty students peacefully distributed literature imploring motorists and passersby to
"take the war home to mommy," but not everyone accepted their offers graciously. One
motorist actually got out of his vehicle and angrily confronted the demonstrators, but did
not initiate physical contact. Demands for a Peace Foundation funded and supported by
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EIU met defeat by Fite, who claimed such a foundation could not be financed by state
funds from the operating budget, and suggested they take the idea to the Student Senate.
The Senate again displayed its disenchantment with "radical" students by voting down
the allocation of funds to the foundation, 11-5. 75
The protests proved to be the last gasp of the student "radicals." Summer break
dealt the activists a deathblow, and the disease of division debilitated the protest's
longevity. The inability of the Student Senate and the protest organizers to work together
likely split the campus and partly explained the woeful participation in subsequent rallies
and lectures immediately following the May 101h eruption. Additionally, many felt that
the protesters employed ineffective demonstration tactics. A letter endorsed by over forty
students and faculty pointed to the relatively small percentage of participants in the
"street blocking" protests, stating "less than 5% of the student body feels that a disruption
of traffic patterns in Charleston is the way to turn off a war half way around the world."
Signers instead suggested that the student movement had exhausted the effectiveness of
demonstrations, and that letter writing, telephone canvassing, and lobbying accomplished
more permanent changes. "Opinion should be directed toward President Nixon rather
than President Fite and that the legislative power of our country is to be found on the
banks of the Potomac rather than the banks of the [local river] Embarrass."76

Conclusion
In an era wrought with extreme campus unrest culminating with the Kent State

shootings, Eastern Illinois University's anti-war protests never reached cataclysmic
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proportions.

Antiwar protests seldom materialized, thanks to a divided student body

more concerned with immediate campus issues than with a conflict halfway around the
world. Eastern's activists focused on an. ultra-repressive administration that threatened
student rights, rather than what many students perceived as a distant, inconsequential
international conflict.
Regardless of the failure or success of Eastern's activists, there definitely existed
a penchant to rebel against an outdated, totalitarian university structure.

President

Doudna rightfully shoulders much blame for this student backlash, but the general aura of
revolution existent everywhere certainly wielded a heavy blow that nearly crumbled the
"ivory towers" of Eastern Illinois University.

CHAPTER IV
ILLINOIS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

In February 1970, Illinois State University (ISU) held a statewide Vietnam
Moratorium meeting. Students across the state packed up their belongings and ideas and
headed to the beautiful rural community of Bloomington to discuss protest methods
aimed at changing the tune of the U.S. foreign policy from one of dissonance to one of
harmony. Previous moratorium successes propelled such bright-eyed youths out of their
dorms and onto the road of change, with all signs pointing to ISU. The gathering focused
on establishing new draft counseling techniques as well as future efforts to educate the
community on the war's futility and the economic crisis caused by the conflict. The
Moratorium Committee viewed the effort as one step in a rising tide of antiwar activity
that would peak in mid-April with a three-day fast and a massive demonstration at the
Internal Revenue Service Centers. 1 While cornfields dominated the scenery along the
way, excitement intensified once students breached the city's outer limits. Looking close
enough, one might spot the turnoff for the small, quiet institution of Illinois Wesleyan
University located just a few miles up the road.
While ISU became a locus for hawks and doves representing numerous
constituencies debating war-related issues, delivering lectures, and initiating petitions and
proposals opposing anti-demonstration laws on Illinois campuses, Illinois Wesleyan
University (IWU), located within walking distance of ISU, remained comparatively
silent.

Instead, IWU approached the Vietnam War and the corresponding student

1 Argus, 13 February 1970. Protesting the IRS served to place emphasis on the discontent of many
concerning taxation for military expenditures.
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movement cautiously and calmly due largely to the university's deeply rooted tendencies
toward democratic processes.

When the school did consider officially supporting

Vietnam-related programs such as the Moratorium days in 1969-1970, for example, it did
so only through thoughtful evaluation of such a program's purpose, as well as
cooperative planning and approval among the faculty, students, and administration. Such
meticulous dealings made rash, potentially violent situations less likely, and brought a
campus consensus that limited community or student alienation from the university.
The low level of antiwar protests and marches, planned or spontaneous, in no way
indicated a lack of antiwar sentiment. As the seemingly unending war continued and
casualties mounted, IWU students and the entire campus community gradually adopted
antiwar stances. While instances of disagreement occasionally surfaced, students and
faculty generally agreed that U.S. involvement in the war should be terminated. This
consensus, coupled with the administration's tolerance for student expressions of dissent
and its truly legitimate claim of "neutrality" towards the Indochina conflict, produced a
calmer, gentler antiwar movement at IWU. IWU provided few reasons, and even fewer
visible targets against which students rebelled.

A Tradition of Democracy

IWU' s cooperative atmosphere, which yielded few protests, is best explained in
the context of faculty, administrative, and student relations in the fifties and sixties. The
university aimed to encourage democracy and wisely kept abreast of trends in education
and society and allowed curriculum changes and social events planning to fall to faculty
and students. Former Student Senate President George Vinyard recalled the university's
resistance to top-heavy administrative power by refusing to expand its administrative
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staff and encouraging greater student and faculty participation in issues of governance. 2
The administration largely viewed its role as supervisory, which explains its relative
invisibility during the antiwar years. Articles in the student newspaper Argus, rarely
mentioned any administrative actions or statements on the war, save during the Kent
State incident, suggesting that the university "leaders" left the issue to the students and
faculty.
The curriculum development best symbolized this democratic approach.
Instructors controlled the nature and type of instruction provided and largely dictated
matters affecting the curriculum. 3

This approach garnered respect from college

educators, while rising tuition and higher salaries attracted many top-notch professors to
IWU.

This new professorate brought the most recent developments in education,

including more interdisciplinary, specialized studies rather than superficial survey
courses, as well as increased individualized projects and assignments. 4 This studentcentered approach appeased the "student power" demands for more student freedom and
provided opportunities for individual expressions of non-conformity. It perhaps lessened
the sense of student alienation so prevalent elsewhere and likely eased student anger
since the classes themselves provided peaceful outlets for assertions of freedom from the
in loco parentis policies of other schools.

The early inclusion of students in university governance similarly stifled reasons
for rebellion of any nature. Instead of subjects to a ruthless dictator, the student body
2 George Vinyard, lllinois Wesleyan University: Growth, Turning Points and New Directions since
the Second World War (Bloomington: Illinois Wesleyan University Press, 1975), 31.
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enjoyed participation and representation on administrative and faculty committees. By
the end of the fifties, students sat on all standing university committees, and the student
senate acquired complete control over activity fee expenditures. 5
IWU's liberalism regarding student and faculty involvement and autonomy
provided a breeding ground for peaceful collaboration.

The university reflected its

power-sharing approach in the appointment of the presidency to Robert Eckley, an
economist, rather than an individual with a background education or administrative
affairs. When Eckley took the reigns in 1968, the Harvard graduate smartly avoided
upsetting the democratic balance so deeply entrenched and set as his goals increased
financial and academic strength, since that was "something I thought I knew how to do." 6
His decision to avoid administrative overhaul proved prescient. By increasingly allowing
more democratic processes to prevail, IWU students never felt the need to rebel against
an enemy that simply did not exist.

The Antiwar Movement Begins

While a democratic atmosphere discouraged violent clashes between the faculty,
students, and administration, the IWU community still had its share of disagreements
over the Vietnam War. As on most campuses, however, many at IWU initially supported
the war.

A November, 1967 Argus featured numerous student pro-war opinions,

claiming that the war was "halting a Communist threat to strengthen democratic policy."7
In fact, the lone group of antiwar advocates at the time originated from the religious
5
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community. 8

Long recognized as the "liberal" wmg of U.S. Protestantism by its

involvement in such antiwar groups as the National Council of Churches (NCC),
Methodist denominational leaders actually criticized the NCC for not being activist
enough, 9 stressing the church's mandate to actively pursue social and moral obligations.
The United Methodist Church contended "a church lacking courage to act decisively on
personal and social issues loses its claim to moral authority." 10
In keeping with these traditions, Illinois State University Campus minister and
director of the Wesleyan Foundation John Robert McFarland dedicated a 1967
Thanksgiving Day sermon in a nearby local church to those killed in the conflict.
McFarland's sermon served as a kind of apologia for the North Viet Cong; they
continued their battle against the U.S. because "to admit defeat would be to surrender all
pride," which they struggled so hard to retrieve from the French years earlier. Here,
according to McFarland, the Viet Cong "pride" symbolized honor, whilst the U.S. "pride"
reflected only the greedy ambitions of the war contractors, who reaped the financial
benefits of a prolonged conflict, while never themselves setting foot upon foreign soil.
Recalling a story of a parent whose child returned to him in a coffin, McFarland stated
the following:
Who then killed my son? .. .I killed him. You killed him. Prideful and ambitious
politicians killed him. The armed forces of his own nation killed him. The guilt
of his death is upon us all .... Each new day brings more oblong gray boxes to rest
on our doorstep.
This was predictable because the religious sectors were so deeply entrenched in the Civil Rights
Movement.
8
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the Vietnam War," Peace and Change 27(2) (April 2002): 276.
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"As Christians we owe our primary allegiance not to any race or clan, not to nation or
flag," but to "God, the provider of the only true liberty and freedom," preached
McFarland from the pulpit. 11
McFarland's decision to deliver such an impassioned sermon suggests the
intensity with which some Methodists opposed the war specifically, and violence
generally.

A letter to Religious Studies chair Dr. Jim Whitehurst from a national

emergency committee called the "Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam,"
summarized the church's position; the committee called the conflict "immoral, illegal,
and against our national interests." 12 Carter instead encouraged Americans to sacrifice
material and time to help rebuild Vietnam, rather than destroy it. Carter did not promote
radical political change or violent revolution, but rather cooperation and friendship in
ending the conflict.
Indifferent to the war's outcome, the religious sector instead spoke out against the
enormous casualty tolls and pleaded for the victory of the "human spirit." Americans,
according to a 1968 IWU sermon in the University Chapel by Charlie Watts, had become
desensitized to the incredible loss of human life. "The war is served up on TV with the
evening meal, and we hardly flinch at the piled-up bodies anymore," argued Watts. Such
an emotional disaster, Watts feared, led to an inability to distinguish right and wrong,
good and evil.

The main Christian problem was not the war itself, but this

desensitization. Watts noted: "lfwe cease to regard horror as horrible, if we bear lightly

11 John McFarland, "Thanksgiving and Vietnam," a sermon performed at First Methodist Church
and Wesley Foundation, 19 November 1967, The Ames Library, Illinois Wesleyan University,
Bloomington, Illinois (henceforth Ames).

"Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam," letter to Dr. James Whitehurst, 22 March
1968, Jim Whitehurst Papers, Ames.
12
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[on] other people's sufferings, if we succumb to this numbness of conscience, then we
may win a war, but lose our own souls." 13 Rhetoric such as McFarland's and Watts's
provided the campus's sole voice of urgency in a crowd of passivity in the early years of

I}

the war.
It would be nearly a year before the students heard either Watts's or McFarland's

cries, mostly because the students were not listening. While nationally 73% of college
students believed in a Supreme Being or God in 1968, 64% did not attend church.
Epitomizing the individuality pervading all aspects of the college community and
curriculum, students had their own ideas about God, claiming that they could "reason"
the need for a God, but not for a church. 14

Many students became increasingly

disenchanted with an out-of-date, conservative institution such as religion, and were more
concerned with the "here" rather than the "hereafter." 15 IWU students gradually looked
elsewhere for guidance, creating such spaces as The Phoenix, a coffeehouse fashioned out
of an old residence in an obscure part of campus.

From 1966-1971, The Phoenix

provided a haven for those inclined to folk songs, poetry, social concerns, and protests.
This administration-tolerated, counter-cultural establishment promoted individual nonconformity, and led students away from the traditional mainstays like school dances and
proms. 16
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Student disillusion with organized religion did not prevent IWU religious leaders
like Chaplain William White from deploring the war and publicly stating the church's
moral objections, but the IWU religious community's impact on the student movement
appears limited.

While White did help establish the Phoenix, IWU's position as a

private, Methodist institution had little other direct effect on the antiwar movement's
direction. While nationally the major religious antiwar groups like NCC and Clergy and
Laymen Concerned About Vietnam (both of which viewed Methodists members as the
most radical) flourished, such a consensus about the war never existed locally.
Regarding NCC, historian Jill K Gill attested, "the NCC member denominations could
not yet find a clear, theologically based moral center within the murky Vietnam issue
around which to generate consensus." 17 The community churches were not very involved
due to the divisive nature of the Vietnam War within their congregations.

Draft

counseling, so central to religious antiwar activity nationally, never mushroomed in the
Bloomington community. While there were many pastors willing to counsel, very few
students employed their services, and only one took advice and actually fled to Canada to
avoid induction. 18

The Rise of "Studentis Erectus"
It was not the church, then, that persuaded an increasing number of students to

wholeheartedly oppose the war, but rather the tumultuous events of 1968, especially the
May 3 Tet Offensive. The sudden attack in Vietnam ignited the first IWU protest event,

17
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drawing over 600 students and ten faculty members to a discussion forum. 19

The

nationally televised protests at the Chicago Democratic National Convention in August
1968 also stirred the IWU student movement, but did not shake it. Students reacted
slowly, first questioning the apathy of their peers and whether silence could be
maintained during a time of profound change. An Argus editorial criticized the student
population for such inactivity. The spoof lambasted the Wesleyan student for being "too
'cool' to become involved, a brave non-conformist which will not buckle to outside
pressure to become concerned about the world swirling around it." The article further
chastised the institution for remaining "calmly aloof---consorting only with the gods. At
IWU, everything is done properly through 'channels' ... This eliminates the need for riots,
demonstrations, and other such 'messy' approaches." 20 Here a student not only criticized
the students' reserve, but also the democratic university governing approach. As an
alternative, he actually promoted riots and denounced peaceful channels of discontent.
Occasional calls for student action continued throughout the 1968-69 school year.
"The Gadfly," an anonymous weekly columnist, struck often, urging the student body to
become "Studentis Erectus," a force standing upright or "erect," against its position at the
bottom of the "evolutionary ladder." This particular student warned against Nixon's
attempt to return the emerging "Studentis Erectus," to its previous species, "Wormus
Libris," "crawling timidly on a lower stratum of society, its only activity was seasonal
migration and avid pursuit of its sexual opposite or some portion thereof." 21 Student
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body President Roy Hankins also took a lead criticizing his slothful constituents, insisting
"nothing short of true STUDENT POWER (would radical student involvement seem
milder?) will suffice to assure Wesleyan of being an institution with a future relevant to
this and succeeding generations of students." He demanded students sever the parentchild relationship the institution imposed, and actively participate in changing the
political landscape. 22
Indeed the IWU student body did embrace a more visible and assertive attitude as
the first protest march occurred in May 1969. Over 2,000 Illinois State University and

rwu

students formed picket lines opposing the university-enforced female dorm hour

regulations that they felt impeded their freedom. 23 Nevertheless, campus administrators
met the potentially "radical" act with calmness and cooperation.

George Vinyard

recalled that dialogue between the students and the administration seldom broke down as
all university factions eagerly sought to extinguish any sparks before the campus became
engulfed in the flames of violent student revolution. 24

Even Student body President

Hankins, despite his call for "radical" student power, advocated peaceful, democratic
university-approved channels to accomplish change. He encouraged students to aspire to
leadership positions, citing that students comprised only 13 per cent of the total
membership in administrative-faculty-student committees.
should inhabit 42 per cent of the membership. 25
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A Splendid Little Moratorium
The tumult of the 1969-70 school year provided the opportunity for students to
quash the apathy label while maintaining a cooperative, thoughtful approach to the
Indochina conflict acceptable to both the campus and the surrounding community.
Nowhere did IWU students and faculty epitomize this better than during the 1969
October Vietnam Moratorium. First, the student senate refused to approve a proposal
supporting the Moratorium until it included an amendment requiring student committees
to cooperate with the faculty committees. 26 The Senate nearly unanimously agreed,
passing the desired collaborative amendment as well as one supporting class suspension
only after 11:00 am on October 15. This meshed with the faculty's desire to "want an
interruption, not a disruption, of procedures."27
Secondly, the student body's aversion to violence calmed any outstanding fears
that the event would spiral out of control. Student demands for faculty involvement and
careful, orderly planning eased lingering apprehensions, while their insistence on
following the National Moratorium Committee's goal of providing a day for discussion,
not protest, silenced critics.

Adhering strictly to the Moratorium's ideals, the student

senate almost unanimously passed a program that would showcase both sides of the
debate, with faculty members holding objective discussions and student forums. The fact
that almost every student senator agreed to produce a non-biased presentation exhibited a
concerted effort to avoid possible backlash from pro-war students and community
members, a situation that could result in violence. As Philosophy Professor John Vander
Waal contended, "if it [the moratorium] is to be educational, all sides should be
26
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presented.

It'll simply be a day of propaganda if SDS [Students for a Democratic

Society] and pacifists are the only ones participating."28
Nevertheless critics abounded, especially amongst faculty, focusing particularly
on whether the university itself should take an institutional stand against the war.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy Larry Colter questioned the moratorium planners'
motivation. He wondered if the idea was to have the university go on record opposing
the war or to spend time just thinking about it. Either way Colter quipped, "Is it the place
of the university as an institution to adopt a political resolution?" Political Scientist Dr.
Robert Leh raised similar concerns, stating, "it is not necessary to commit the university.
It is important to become personally involved and committed." Speech Professor Marie
Robinson suggested holding classes and devoting discussions to Vietnam, while
insurance Professor Donald Strand outright opposed the moratorium, holding that it
would be ill-advised to show dissension during this crucial period of Vietnam
negotiations.
Several faculty senators quickly quashed the two latter criticisms.

History

Professor Paul Bushnell directly contradicted Strand, arguing, "a stand is the only way to
promote negotiations or settlement." Robinson's request met a similar fate, as a voice
vote soundly defeated her amendment to devote class time to Vietnam discussion.
Faculty agreed that Vietnam's importance merited class cancellation, but only under
faculty supervision. In the end the faculty senate adopted Leh's proposal. Faculty voted
to allow student-faculty committees to plan the day, but maintained that the institution
itself remain objective. Dr. Whitehurst agreed, and stressed faculty commitment and
involvement by circulating letters encouraging faculty participation. Whitehurst warned
28
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faculty not to succumb to the laziness or "numbness of conscience" that Watts feared,
citing the rising Vietnam death toll and failed negotiations. 29
The October 15 Moratorium-which included faculty and chaplain-led discussion
sessions, the reading of names of Illinois youths killed in Vietnam, several movies, and a
student-faculty forum-transpired exactly as planned. The discussion forums were not
mere outlets of dissent or provocateurs of violence but instead reflected the rational,
controlled environment IWU epitomized. The faculty generally favored U.S. withdrawal,
debating only how to accomplish such a feat with minimal human loss, and without

° Follow-up Argus articles explained exactly what

abandoning the containment policy. 3

had been discussed at the forums, as well as praising the entire campus for a wellorganized effort.
Yet something was missing from the follow-up articles: student letters to the
editor. Devoid of any student comments on the Moratorium or the war itself, Argus
depicted the students as passive observers while the professors and administrators
spouted their beliefs regarding the Indochina conflict. The following day's cover story,
"War Moratorium Elicits Conflicting Views," might have been re-titled "conflicting
FACULTY views," as the supposedly open forums turned into faculty debates. In fact,
of the five immediate articles covering the Moratorium, four focused on the faculty's
critique, and the fifth on the administration's discussion forum concerning the war's
impact on the IWU budget. 31 Possibly jaded by their exclusion from the debates, students
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sensed that their opinions and actions counted little. As a result, a sense of alienation
developed for some.
The following month brought a serious shift in student activity, yet IWU's
reputation for rational thought and action triumphed. Instead of composing angry letters
denouncing the university's treatment of its students, the student body turned to its
representative body, the senate. Finally taking a definitive political stance, the Student
Senate proposed to:
endorse the policy of withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam by June,
1971. Further, that the United States provide for the protection or any civilian
peoples in South Vietnam ... whose lives are endangered by terrorist or other
threatening actions. 32
While the second part of the proposal regarding the U.S. protection of civilians was
eventually eliminated, the call for withdrawal of troops passed 38-2, and the IWU
students joined their comrades at colleges nation-wide in officially condemning the
U.S.'s involvement in Indochina.
The National Moratorium Committee's call for students to "take it to the
community" in November resonated with students.

Retaining their discipline and

reputation as peaceful dissenters, IWU students distributed Vietnam materials promoting
American withdrawal at local country clubs, churches, and downtown hot spots. They
also encouraged residents to send committee-furnished cards to Nixon protesting the
war. 33
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Students continued such peaceful protest throughout the school year. Joining
other Illinois schools, IWU representatives delivered proposals to the Illinois
Constitutional

Convention

meeting

in

Springfield,

where

state

congressional

representatives embarked on the complicated task of rewriting the state constitution. The
proposals included "making the political process more democratic, ending political
repression ... the present collusion between the military, the corporations and the
universities in this state."34 Even as late as February IWU students remained involved in
the State Moratorium Committee, though the moratorium failed to remain newsworthy,
garnering only minor columns in Argus instead of previous front-page headlines.
The faculty, meanwhile, remained largely silent. A November Faculty Senate
proposal condemning treatment of POW's notwithstanding, faculty participation in
moratorium activities sharply plummeted. This is unsurprising given the faculty's stated
aversion to taking an official, united institutional stand on the Vietnam War. As Physics
Professor Gary Kessler stated, the university should retain its objectivity as well as
encourage individuality and moral values. 35 Additionally, the faculty possibly felt it had
been over-involved in earlier antiwar protests and sought to step back and give students
an outlet.

Feeling the Heat of Kent State

The cataclysmic events of May 1970 changed everything. It shook the tiny,
insular IWU community and forced all students and faculty to sit up and take notice of a
conflict that not only claimed lives abroad, but also now claimed lives merely two states
34
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away. The U.S. invasion of Cambodia followed immediately by the murder of four Kent
State students protesting that very decision brought the war home. As Chaplain White
stated, the shootings "personalized" the issue by exposing the vulnerability of all student
activists. 36 IWU responded again with teamwork. Putting outstanding divisions aside, the
university coalesced as IWU students worked with pastors and religious professors to set
up rallies and memorial services aimed at mourning the dead and understanding the
present situation.

The Student Action Committee for Peace (SACP), a student

organization formed through the Student Senate, oversaw the events and hoped to
"educate and involve people of our campus and the community in the events of the
world."37
SACP activities included encouraging faculty class time discussions about the
war, a special Argus issue about the situation, a memorial service conducted by Chaplain
William White, petitions to cancel classes, and a student march to Bloomington
Courthouse and the Selective Service Office at ISU. 38

Playing on the religious

community, SACP also composed a letter to local pastors requesting an entire sermon
dedicated to the war, or at least the reading of a prayer both mourning war casualties and
hoping for a speedy and immediate resolution. 39 The SACP also planned a Friday rally,
encouraging complete citizen attendance and participation. Unlike the last attempt to
coordinate faculty, students, and administration, this effort featured speakers from every
part of the university. .Their backgrounds varied enormously, ranging from former and
36
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current student leaders from the Student Senate and the Black Student Association, to
professors of Law, Religion, History, Speech, and even a Board of Trustees member. 40
The various reactions of these three factions require an analysis of each in tum,
beginning with the faculty. Some professors like John Heyl of History, and Walter
Wilkins, a Social Science librarian, walked the traditional, beaten path of merely
providing objective information, for instance recounting Cambodia's history and the
turning points that brought the situation to its current state. 41
"education" portion of the Student Action Committee's purpose.

This fulfilled the
Yet other, more

"radical" faculty could not resist introducing their personal opinions. Dr. Paul Bushnell,
a holdover from the Moratorium debates, condemned the U.S. government outright,
dubbing the war a "new kind of recklessness" in foreign policy, while chastising Nixon
for "abandoning" Congress in continuing the war without its approval.

He also

questioned America's democratic institutions, claiming that indoctrination and repression
existed as much domestically as in Communist-led countries. 42
Most faculty members did not speak out in such accusatory tones, nor did they
habitually condemn democratic institutions. Professors Donald Strand of Insurance, Jerry
Stone of Humanities, and Heyl from the History Department encouraged faith in the
political system.

Change must be made through the elections of favorable antiwar

candidates, and patience in the current political negotiations must persist. 43
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Students echoed these faculty convictions. Hankins, for example, repeated
Bushnell's statement that Congress never sanctioned the war, insisting without
specification and that students should do something to stop it. Jim Boisclair, a political
science major, poetically pointed out the irony that "Western man" glorifies himself in
war while characterizing war as evil. Biology student Elbert Shaw called for outright
revolution, though provided no strategy or ideology. Student Senate President Mark
Sheldon offered somewhat detailed solutions, such as cooperation with ISU, community
involvement and education, and resistance to wartime institutions like the draft. 44
Some students, however, were not so quick to condemn the Kent State shootings.
Student Dar Fort defended the National Guardsmen responsible for shooting the Kent
State students, reminding IWU that the shootings did occur during a rather violent student
protest and that the officers, scared and outnumbered, allowed chaos to triumph. She
continued her onslaught by taking to task those demanding immediate withdrawal, stating
that such a rash act would encourage communism's unpreventable spread, and
consequent murders. 45 The IWU students themselves were not practicing democracy,
according to student Renna Bussell, though they hypocritically called for it now:
Two weeks ago we were asked to write [IWU President] Dr. Eckley in order to
get classes cancelled for May 9. The notice read, "Prove our Democratic system
works." This implies it would only be "proved" if President Eckley gave an
affirmative endorsement. Is the Democratic system "proved" only when we get
what we want from it? That is like saying our parents love us only when they say
yes.46
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Yet students maintained enough unity to influence the administration, particularly
President Robert Eckley.

Eckley, however, already held somewhat tolerant attitudes

about student strife. As he stated in his memoir, "if the unrest takes no more serious form
than blocking of facilities, if the operation of the University is not immediately
threatened ... our response should be mild and not resort immediately to physical methods
of removal."47
IWU students never reached such drastic levels of disobedience. Typical of many
universities (including EIU), IWU's most heated event was the "flag controversy" where
students demanded-or in IWU's case politely requested-the campus flag be lowered to
half-mast to mourn all Vietnam-related deaths. Instead of hundreds of students defiantly
and dramatically marching on the flagpole or the president's house like at ISU, the SACP
obediently employed proper protest channels by asking Eckley's permission. Initially
denying the request, Eckley offered to reconsider his decision if the students garnered
enough student body support.

Again the unfolding event reflected a respect for

democracy. Student Senate President George Vinyard quickly polled the senators, who
favored the action 28-4. Eckley then consulted with the Faculty Advisory Committee
who concurred with the Senate, leaving little doubt about the campus sentiment. The flag
was lowered, according to Eckley, for four Students killed at Kent State and for all those
killed in Southeast Asia. 48
Yet IWU could not escape the tumultuous month of May 1970 without a parting
shot of controversy. The wall of unity and camaraderie, built throughout the school year
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through "calm reasoning" and "communicative action among the different groups within
the university," cracked. Student Ronald Klipp's decision to attend the Honor's
Convocation donning a shirt depicting an upside-down American flag highlighted the
generational split between students and faculty that lay hidden like fault lines. Just as
constant pressure causes eruptions along such faults, Klipp' s action tipped the Richter
scale and released a full-fledged earthquake of retorts. The faculty, though generally
antiwar, disapproved and denounced Klipp's actions as "infantile attention-getting
mechanisms." Community members similarly complained of Klipp's disrespect for the
flag, citing it as blatant disregard for freedom.
Klipp and other students viewed the flag's symbolic meaning differently. Klipp
contended that because the flag represented freedom, it was his right to "freedom of
expression" that allowed him to wear the flag as he did.

Other students blasted the

professorate for directly attacking Klipp personally and not allowing him the "freedom"
to explain his actions. As student Chuck Bonney editorialized, the faculty "disregarded
Mr. Klipp's Constitutional and human rights." 49
Kai Nielson summarized the consequence and meaning of the Klipp controversy:
When this university can no longer tolerate peaceful dissent, when tradition
becomes more important than relevant action, and the reaction to this gesture has
further shown its relevance, when academic threats are used to stifle free
expression, then this university is indeed in distress. 50
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A Return to Normalcy
IWU adjourned for summer break not a moment too soon.

With the Klipp

controversy following closely behind the Kent State situation, only the dismissal of
classes defused the bomb. Even Chaplain White acknowledged the detrimental affect of
summer break on the continuity of the student movement, claiming that the months of
student absence "voided the experience" of the previous year. 51 Students returned in
August refreshed and relaxed, choosing to walk the more familiar path of rational,
democratic and intellectual antiwar activities, while avoiding the cracks of disunity
created at the tail end of the previous school year.
Perhaps unwilling to provoke another controversial incident, possibly frightened
by the near campus implosion several months prior, or convinced that Nixon's
withdrawal of troops signaled the ending of the war, the following school year saw the
majority of IWU students and faculty saying little about the Vietnam War. Students did
not engage in massive letter-writing campaigns to senators and representatives, as
Vinyard had urged. Nor did the campus respond either way to the expansion of the
Vietnam conflict to a Southeast Asian war, with the invasions of Laos and Cambodia.
Vinyard's request for a moratorium-like protest took nearly a year to materialize, 52 and
any serious discussions about Vietnam or other pertinent student issues occurred only at
ISU. Antiwar student commentaries disappeared, and the Argus resorted to reprinting
more Associated Press releases about the war. The five-part Scranton Commission's
National Report on Campus Violence, for example, repeatedly occupied front-page news,
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as well as discussions about a United States National Students Association-backed peace
treaty calling for immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces. 53 Talk of an all-volunteer force
that would replace the draft also garnered headlines, while IWU students, faculty, and
administration seemed to take a vow of silence.
Not all students remained quiet, however. Some students still insisted on peaceful,
subtle protest, and sought practical democratic solutions. A small coalition of students
formed a new antiwar organization, the Movement for a New Congress (MNC), to assist
peace candidates in running in the 1970 congressional elections. Students campaigned
for certain candidates opposed to the war and violence, and consequently learned the
inner-workings of the political web-lobbying, campaigning, and publicizing the
candidate's platform.

Because the MNC promoted education along with a political

agenda, the IWU faculty fully supported member students, and even approved their class
absence during the two weeks leading up to the election. 54
Despite this genuine attempt to engage students in antiwar activities, the campus
silence proved deafening. History major Benjamin Keylin, IWU Chairmen of MNC,
expressed amazement at "the vast number of students who are completely unaware or
apathetic about events that surround them." Regarding the "Vietnam conflict," Keylin
challenged the apathetic community to question the war's constitutionality and morality,
while encouraging students to "take action."55
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IWU students and faculty ignored Keylin's requests as the 1971-72 school
featured even less Argus coverage of the Vietnam conflict and less student commentary.
Finally, Nixon's bombing campaign in May 1972 stirred some campus activity, and
ignited interest in a national student strike and emergency moratorium. Although hardly
national leaders, a segment of the IWU student body ardently supported the protest.
The animal of student awareness had apparently returned, and its prey turned out
to be the IWU students and faculty.

Nixon's escalation of the Indochina conflict

generated an underground student newspaper titled, El Lobo, translated "The Wolf." Far
left-wing articles abounded, chastising the faculty's silence on the war, Nixon, and
former President Lyndon B. Johnson. It beseeched students to participate in the upcoming
student strike, calling again on "Studentis Erectus" and "students in all American
universities to assert themselves and make their position on the war known." The paper
even encouraged students to deduct the federal excise tax on student bills, calling it a
"war tax." 56 But the vigor with which students opposed the war in 1969-70 never
reemerged.

Like many other campuses, IWU's activism plummeted following that

turbulent year as other social issues took precedence and apathy towards the war ensued.

Conclusion
Throughout the antiwar era, Illinois Wesleyan University followed a similar
pattern of student activism found at most universities-mostly non-violent, and seldom
radical. The university still saw its share of controversy, including a protest on the
university quad where students collectively laid down, motionless, symbolizing the
Vietnam death toll. There was also one commencement ceremony where many graduates
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spattered peace signs atop their mortars, provocative enough that one faculty person
simply refused to participate in the ceremony. 57 But the majority of radical student action
did not rise directly from oppositio~ to the Vietnam War.

Instead, those few

confrontations between faculty, students, and administrators centered on issues like
student rights, infringement of the democratic processes students enjoyed, the school's
role in politics, Klipp's freedom of expression statement that split students and faculty,
and the silence of both faculty and students throughout much of the war years. These
internal-that is, campus-based problems--galvanized "radical" student unrest more than
any international or domestic event.
Yet IWU's occasions of thoughtful dissent-the moratorium, the Movement for a
New Congress, and the peaceful "flag-controversy''--symbolized the lost opportunity of
the student antiwar movement. IWU' s devotion to peaceful protest, national programs,
and democratic expressions proved admirable in a time when many schools abandoned
such approaches. It is intriguing to ponder the movement's potential had all schools
followed IWU's patience and cooperation.

Would violence have erupted?

Would

buildings have burned? Would four more students have graduated from Kent State?
Regardless, the fact remains that IWU had an historical bent toward peace, order, and
cooperation. Already a "democratic" institution committed to student and faculty rights
and representation, and completely isolated from direct or indirect involvement with the
U. S. government and Vietnam, the IWU administration provided little firepower for

57 Chaplain William White, interview by author, 28 October 2003, Charleston, Illinois. The dates
of these events are unknown, but White suggests that they likely occurred in May 1970.
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"gun-toting" student radicals.

The "spirit of the campus"58 had already promoted

"participatory democracy'' well before the Student for a Democratic Society, and
provided the mechanisms for a peaceful, intellectual student movement.

58 Chaplain William White used this phrase to explain the university's general preferences for
peace and abhorrence of violence.

CHAPTERV
CONCLUSION

By the mid-seventies, the student "movement" had lost momentum and direction.
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was nearly complete, and much of the pioneering,
"radical" baby boomer generation completed its journey through higher education. While
this enormous and powerful graduating class continued to address similarly controversial
issues such as environmental concerns, feminism, and political deception, the sense of
urgency and destiny that they had to save America from the "age of twilight" no longer
existed. This is due to the fact that students, despite their many misgivings about higher
education, actually did acquire significant life-long lessons that cannot be measured by
tests or recounted in textbooks.
They learned the importance of a unified front in accomplishing change. Student
apathy, for example, thwarted activist attempts to challenge the university administration.
Like an infectious disease, it spread quickest when left unchecked such as at EIU, and it
exhibited immunity to calls for "Studentis Erectus" at IWU. UIUC experienced flashes
of conquering this debilitating virus, at one time garnering one-third student participation
in antiwar protests, but inevitably fell well short of achieving a majority. Without a
majority, students learned not only that change was slow, but nearly impossible.
Students also learned how to pick their battles. For nearly a decade, Illinois
students witnessed and participated in protests against national policies such as Civil
Rights, Free Speech, and the Vietnam War, but with only minor success. Impatient
students infused with the "aura of rebellion" realized that perhaps they had overestimated
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their power, and did not possess the resources to affect national change, at least not from
central Illinois.

Local campus concerns replaced national issues, and the university

administration replaced the U.S. government as the target of student "radicals." EIU's
largest protest, for example, revolved around broken administrative promises regarding
tuition.

Local campus issues like ROTC's presence and the university's military

complicity with the U.S. Department of Defense dominated the list of grievances
presented by UIUC activists during the May, 1970 Student Strike.
But IWU offered the greatest lesson of the era: the importance of democratic
processes. Illinois Wesleyan's long tradition of ensuring student and faculty participation
in university governance helped IWU avoid attacks on the university that occurred at EIU
and UIUC. Only through trial-and-error did EIU and especially UIUC's administration
grasp the necessity of disregarding in loco parentis and including all university factions
in the decision-making process. Their reluctance to do so earlier in the sixties played a
significant role in generating violent student outbursts. UIUC students rioted in the
streets in the March of 1970, for example, because the university failed to consider the
student body's position regarding both the presence of General Electric Company
recruiters, and the appearance of controversial speaker William Kunstler.
But administrations at both EIU and UIUC learned from their mistakes. Police
forces at UIUC showed more restraint regarding protesters, prompting one student's
confession that "we'd have a lot of people out here if someone would go downstairs and
say 'the police are out there busting heads. "' 1 Chancellor Jack Peltason made concerted
efforts to discuss issues with students in hopes of avoiding miscommunication that could
lead to violence, and also to reopen the university-approved "protest channels." EIU's
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President Quincy Doudna similarly enlisted democratic processes, enthusiastically
approving a campus referendum regarding whether or not the U.S. flag should be lowered
on campus to mourn the Kent State victims.

By utilizing an all-campus vote, the

university administration avoided charges of "dictator" that dominated Doudna's reign,
while simultaneously preventing violent student backlash.

In short, university

administrators found a cure for 1960s student unrest-democracy.
Student apathy, shifting targets of "radicals," and the installation of more
democratic processes helped dispel the sense of rebellion rampant throughout the antiwar
years, while the mass exodus of "baby boomers" from campuses nailed the coffin of
student activism shut. The victor of "the Battle for the University," however, is not so
easily identifiable. Students had their share of successes, the most prominent being the
dissolution of in loco parentis.

The administration cannot be charged with a loss,

however, as they retained much of their power over university operations. Instead, the
real winner of this epic struggle was the university itself. Bitter conflict at each of these
three Illinois institutions hastened the transition to Clark Kerr's "multiversity," and
created an educational atmosphere conducive to free speech, political activism, and the
basic exercise of civil rights. In the end, these universities achieved the multiversity's
goal of "coexistence rather than peace," and ushered in the modem system of education.
Students, faculty, and administrators waged the war and suffered the casualties, but
today's society is the true beneficiary of "the Battle for the University."

1 Daily
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